YouTube Tuesdays: Penetrating thoughts . . .

The best guards are the ones who can go where they want to go with the ball, despite what the other team is throwing at them. Essentially, the best guards can penetrate through the heart of the defense in order to better threaten for a score (or easy scoring opportunity for a teammate). Of course, not all guards/wing players are built the same. Though, you do have your archetypes . . .

The Blur: These guys have existed in the NBA since the Cenozoic era. They are short in stature, keep their dribble low, and rely upon blinding speed to get from Point A to Point B. Examples of this include Nate “Tiny” Archibald, Michael Adams, Muggsy Bogues and Avery Johnson. Modern incarnations may be a little bit taller (like the actually 6’0 Chris Paul), or a little bit stronger (like Nate Robinson). These guys all have amazing handles and often go deep into the lane and score amongst the trees. Probably the best examples of this type of player would be Isiah Thomas or Allen Iverson.
Mr.Quick first step: These players rely less upon their top speed, and more on their quick trigger muscles. They utilize a series of triple threat moves (ball fakes, jab steps, etc), or nothing at all, to unnerve their defender. With a drop of a hat (or more often, with the batting of an eyelid) these players explode into decisive motion while their defender fails to react. Another, obvious, component of having a quick first step is having a long stride. Taller guards who have both quickness and length display this form of penetration beautifully. Naturally, Michael Jordan possessed both attributes and mastered the quick first step. Behold! Today some of the best at this were guys who grew up and emulated Jordan’s move in their individual periods of basketball development: Vince Carter (think Toronto version), Tracy McGrady (think Orlando version) and yes, Kobe Bryant.
The Pure Athlete: These guys aren’t top speed demons like Chris Paul, nor do they have all that it takes to be Quick first step artists . . . but they do possess some combination of the two, have ridiculous length and hops. It’s not that they have all the tools needed to get into the lane at any cost, but more of what they can do when they are in the lane that counts. Dr.J fits the bill here, same with guys like Dominique Wilkins and today’s versions: Andre Iguodala, Ronnie Brewer and Jason Richardson. After reviewing these types of players on YouTube I’ve come to the decision that everyone should watch this Top 10 video featuring just Scottie Pippen highlights … not just because he proves my point, but because of the crazy music in the background.
The Guy with all the Moves: Obviously at some stage, players can fit into more than one of these categories. Yes, a young Vince Carter had a great first step, but let’s not forget that he was among the top 5 most athletic players in the history of the sport as well; so a player like Vince could easily be placed in the quick step *or* pure athlete category. This is not what I mean when I say “guy with all the moves” though; while Vince is nice here, he’s not a true acrobat who drives the lane like an elusive running back: juking, spinning, side-stepping, hesitating his way to the goal line. Some NBA players have mastered this form of penetration which allows them to use practiced talent and a learned skill to take them where others rely on purely physical abilities to go. Guys with all the moves do have to have speed, quickness and athletic ability as well, but these players string together a sequence of moves almost effortlessly – the only physical force these guys rely upon is momentum. (Like these kids in Russia displaying some of their parcour prowess: this video gets crazy at the 2:19 mark – watch at least 60 seconds of this video from that mark onwards, watch longer if you want to see this kid free run away from a dog in some guy’s private property.) Additionally, these players have the over-all best handles in the game that allows them to use their Running back/Parcour movement skills while still holding onto the ball. Guys with all the moves eventually get from Point A to Point B, even if it takes a Point C, D and E to get there first. You may be familiar with their go-to move . . . the Crossover. Examples of guys who have all the moves include Earl “The Pearl” Monroe, “Pistol” Pete Maravich, Dwyane Wade, Kobe Bryant and Ball Don’t Lie’s Bedlam ‘09 Tournament winner: Deron Williams.

While this post was mostly to categorize the different types of ways guards get into the lane, I kind of wanted to touch on how bigger guys get there (and the chance to post a few more links to videos).

The Freight Train: For the majority of these guard type movement skills, strength is an afterthought. Pure Athletes and some guys with all the moves do need strength to finish the plays they start. But they are a far cry for how forwards and centers start, follow through, and finish plays with strength. Some of these hulks take the concept of momentum to a whole new level as they plow through the lane, dispassionately going through anyone in their way. Not only are these guys big, but they are all also great at running the floor – regardless of their size. We’ve all seen that Charles Barkley clip where he has a full head of steam and goes coast to coast for a two hander where his momentum swings him around the entire basket support system. (1:56 in this 10 minute video) This is a prime example of the Freight Train. Other players we can easily include in this category are Karl Malone, Amaré Stoudemire and, of course, LeBron James.

The Black Tornado (only one player ever): Someone like Vince, Jordan, T-Mac or Wade may defy the laws of gravity. That’s nice. They are able to bend the rules of the natural world to pull off extraordinary moves. Other guys are forces of nature altogether. You don’t need to bend any rules when you make the rules. Shaquille O’Neal took pity on our world, and self-banned this move which he called “The Black Tornado” – a move that he himself agreed was “illegal.” Take cover below!

It is only natural that players of different sizes, speeds, talents and ability would evolve different ways of getting into the lane. Penetration is usually the initiation of good things on offense, as players create advantageous passing angles, draw in defenders, or just plan dunk it on people themselves. Take notice of this, and enjoy these categories as you watch the upcoming season!

EDIT: I completely forgot this category:

The guy who does not look pretty dribbling, but makes amazing passes: Sometimes God gives you seemingly conflicting gifts. For one, you could be 6’9 and a great passer. Unfortunately for you, you are so tall that in order for you to dribble the ball effectively, yet not actually leave it wide open to get stolen from you, you have a really ugly dribble. Not every big guy who dribbles does it poorly, Lamar Odom has a very nice looking dribble and has a great handle with the ball. Magic Johnson also had a great handle on the ball, but he really had to pound the heck out of the ball to make sure it got back up to him fast enough that the guys who defended him (big time steals guys like Isiah Thomas, Alvin Robertson, Mo Cheeks, John Stockton, etc) did not pick his pocket each time down the floor. It was far from the prettiest dribble in the half-court set. The modern player who immediately comes to mind when I think of guys who pass well, but don’t look like they can dribble at all is Andrei Kirilenko. This is a guy who has played point guard internationally and in the 2nd round of the NBA Playoffs – yet Jazz fans cringe whenever he drives to the basket. We don’t trust his dribbling skills at all – yet he does some really amazing things with the ball on occasion (not unlike Magic) with passes: through defenders legs (can’t find the vid of him doing this to Bosh); behind the back passes; no look passes (0:26); over the shoulder on a fast break (0:43); spinning through the lane (2:11); on the run in traffic with no eye-contact with any of your teammates passes; passes through his OWN legs; and so forth. Very good passer, and very creative player – he just looks like he’s murdering a goose when he dribbles. (really, the video to the left is a mixtape which starts out with him dribbling off his foot, and his goose killing continues at the 0:20 mark!)

These aren’t John Hollinger’s dad’s statistics

Okay, I love direct observational research as much as the other guy, but as someone firmly rooted in the sciences (aka. wasting my life in college and beyond), I love quantifiable results. As a result, I find that statistics are vital towards observing, categorizing and understanding the environment that we inhabit (and share with other organisms). Stats are awesome, and I love them (I got 98% in stats in university) . Though, I know that stats can be manipulated and abused – furthermore, statistics do not fully explain the entire situation, nor do sufficient statistics exist that can approach a full knowledge of a hybrid (not just numerical) system.

We can attempt to use statistics to better understand basketball – and as a fan, and non-paid analyst, I’m not alone in this point of view (just check out the Wages of Wins sometime). That said, the statistics that we currently have in basketball are not complete. No current stats exist to fully describe all possible positive actions on the court (e.g. there’s no stat for a defender breaking / slipping a screen and staying on his man, despite the set play run by the offense). Also, some stats that would be useful are just not recorded in the NBA (e.g. in the Adriatic league their stats also include things like how many times a player has their shot blocked, or how many times a player draws a foul – don’t you want to know how many times Dirk gets stuffed, or how many fouls Shaq drew per game during his peak?).

Right now there aren’t enough stats to fully map out good play, and some of the stats that we do have appear to mean more than they actually do! A steal means that a defender has disrupted the offense to the point that a turnover has occurred – many guards and swingmen get steals. The bigman analog has always been blocks, but the most important part of the steal (aka, the change of actual possession of the ball) is lost in a block. Often a blocked shot prevents a made basket, but does not always give possession back to the defending side. In effect, a blocked shot that still gives the ball back to the offense is no better than a defender causing a deflection of a pass where the ball goes out of bounds – and the offensive team retains possession.

Deflections are the most important stat that continues to not be officially counted by the NBA; on one hand it would be difficult to adjudicate (when is it a block? when is it a deflection?), but on the other hand, deflections often lead to other stats. The guy who picks up a ball that’s deflected out of the hand of the ball carrier is rewarded with a steal – but the guy who got the ball out of the ball carrier’s hand (the deflector) doesn’t get credited for causing the play. I think that’s kind of unfair.

In fact the guy who defends well frequently gets jobbed out of a good stat. For years I’ve seen a solid defensive play in the paint by a center (straight up single coverage that results in his man taking a shot – and missing) be recorded as a GREAT defensive board by the power forward (who wasn’t defending anyone, he just happened to get the rebound off of someone else's good defense). I’ve seen this happen on all levels of play. If anything, it prove the limitations of stats, and the limitations of the stats to accurately reward defense.

It’s no secret that defense is way harder to grade by using stats alone. Firstly, there are not enough defensive stats (like the guy who can navigate through a number screens and gets back in time to contest/change a shot gets the same amount of stats as another play who doesn’t even go through the screens and lets his man take an open jumper), and secondly, the stats that do exist do not always mean great defense. A very quick guy like Allen Iverson spent years on the court playing in the passing lanes. This is him gambling on defense to get steals. It’s exciting when a guy does get those break away steals in the game – but it’s not sound, fundamental man defense. Really, this play is sorely discouraged in the case where there isn’t a big shot blocker in the paint to clean up any mess that an unguarded PG getting into the paint can cause.

I know – I’ve seen John Stockton make these same type of ‘Defensive Back’ style steals because he had big Mark Eaton (two time defensive player of the year – once had close to 500 blocks in a season) watching his back. Iverson had the same with Theo Ratliff and Dikembe Mutombo. Chris Paul is another player who benefits from being backed up by shot blocking force of nature Tyson Chandler. If guys like Stockton, Iverson and Paul had Mehmet Okur and Jarron Collins laying down the law in the paint behind them you can be sure that the head coach would have told them to defend their man more, and gamble on defense less.

Over the years I’ve been lucky enough to coach some basketball on the youth developmental level. We tried to go past the lack of collected stats on defense in order to quantify good play on both sides of the ball. An attempt was made to count the number of times the player defending a shooter resulted in that shooter missing. Other times we tried to record good traps on the ball carrier, or how many times the defender harassed the ball handler into turning the ball over. These types of things can be recorded but by far the best defense I’ve ever seen on any level is that where the man being defended does not ever get the ball, entry passes are denied, position is denied, and when he does get the ball – he’s in such a disadvantageous point that he cannot positively help his team when he has the ball. You know what kind of stats that guy gets – for playing the best defense? He gets nothing for it. There is no reward for him that shows up on the boxcore – and this is a failure in terms of statistics being used to categorize and enumerate good play in a game. But if he manages to tip an errantly passed ball that he forces the guy he’s defending into attempting(because he can’t shoot it where he is), the team mate who picks up the ball gets credited for a steal.

Oh yeah, that’s basically it for defense in the NBA, I talked about the fallacy that defensive boards is akin to good defense, I talked about how blocks may stop a shot, but do not give you possession of the ball all that time, and I talked about how steals can be indicative of poor defense, not good defense. (Of course, exceptions to these rules always exist – it is good defense to control a tough defensive rebound that’s contested, or to block a shot to a team mate, or to single handedly strip a guy that  you are defending. But let’s not forget that these instances of good defense are counted just as much as the same stats that are products of situational defense. A ball that rolls do you on defense counts just like a ball that you fought for.)

The long and short of it is that we need more stats – especially on defense. If you’ve read this far down then you are awesome . . . because I’ve tried to make some ‘new’ stats. Some people are good enough for simple points, rebounds, assists, steals and blocks. That’s fine for a casual fantasy basketball league . . . but not good enough if you really watch the game like your life depends on it. I wish there were more stats, and more ways to reward good play – but right now the NBA does not appear to give us things like that (instead the +/- stat is thrown to us, like it means anything). Anyway, I’ve tried to make some new stats and here are five calculations that you can even do at home (studio audience of old ladies says ‘ooooohh’, already put in a receptive mood because of the deal that they got on that juicer they just purchased):

1. Defensive Gambling (DG): This stat is pretty easy – I try to recognize that some of the stats that people get on defense are related to gambling on some level. (Gambling in a passing lane, gambling by leaving your man to get a weak side shot block, gambling by trying to strip a man when the ref is right there, and so forth) We already had blocks and steals . . . but they exist in a world without accumulated risks. The risk here, of course, exists as a foul being called – another stat that we already have. The fun part is balancing the risks vs. the rewards.

The Foul is the base for this equation – as it means that you tried a risky move and you got burned. Not only do you have a penalty against you, but it directly benefits the offensive team. A steal, on the other hand, is a situation where a player takes a risk, is rewarded – and the offensive team is directly disadvantaged. When a team misses a three pointer and the opposing team gets the ball and scores a layup that is a 5 point swing. A steal does not directly mean you gain points, but you directly prevent the chance of points – it’s not a 5 point swing, but it’s a possession swing. I say that this is worth 1.5 fouls, in terms of risk/reward. A block does not guarantee such a similar swing in terms of possession (it does sometimes though), but while a steal only prevents the potential of a shot being taken, a block directly affects shots that are taken. (It’s a shame there’s no stat for shots changed, because a good shot blocker has an aura that surrounds him that changes many shots – for example when players started to scout Kirilenko his blocks went way down . . . but he was changing the same number of net shots as guys changed their shots to avoid getting blocked by him) A block, then, is not as good as a steal, but it’s still good – a block is equal to 1.3 fouls. The full equation for Defensive Gambling is as follows:

Example: In 2003-2004 Andrei Kirilekno was healthy (at this point in his career, he had played in 240 of a total possible 246 games), getting playing time (37.1 mpg), and happy. That season Andrei had 215 blocked shots and 150 steals against 174 fouls. His Defensive Gambling score was astronomical that season. DG = [ ( 215 * 1.3) + (150 * 1.5) ] / 174 DG = [ 279.5 + 225 ] / 174 DG = 3.002893563 So that means that Andrei was gambling at a very fortuitous rate – he’d get away with gambling three times before he would get burned once. If you extrapolate that to how many fouls he averaged per game that season you can see that he was doing something right with all that time on the court. Because the haters probably want to know, Andrei’s career average DG score is 2.25. For a point of reference, Scottie Pippen’s career DG score is 1.41 – and Pip is the prototypical wing defender who made 10 All-Defensive teams in his career. Pippen had way more steals, but he took way too many poor gambles as well. Pippen has 6 seasons where he’s averaged greater than 3 fouls per game. Andrei has none in his career. So put that in your pipe and smoke it!

Clearly looking at things like blocks and steals on their own gives a skewed view of the world – putting it against a risk/reward system is a better frame of reference that we can use to see which players make smart gambles, and which ones do not. Andrei – for all his faults – has a good Defensive Gambling ability if you ask me.

2. Pure Hustle (PH): Pure hustle builds off of the Defensive Gambling equation, but adds more chances for risks and more chances for rewards. Here we see Blocks, Steals and Offensive Rebounds go against Turnovers and Persona Fouls. The common factor for hustle is a turn over. It’s the most benign result of hustle. Too much hustle can result in a foul – which hurts you and your team. This is why a foul is worth more. On the good side of things, hustle can result in good defense, or a second effort (or third, or fourth) on offense. We all remember Tayshawn Prince robbing Reggie Miller with a game winning block. We should all remember Bird stealing the inbounds from Isiah. And we all know that second chance shots can not only allow you to score from an advantageous position – but also result in scores themselves. This is why I think when it comes to hustle, Offensive Rebounds are worth the most, with Blocks and Steals being on equal footing with fouls.

Example: When people think of hustle they are apt to think of garbage guys who don’t have much skill. That type of scrappy play can result in solid contributions for a team, but I think hustle is more than just effort. Hustle is assisted by skill and psychology. It is a risk/reward equation after all – if you go all out all the time you’re just going to pick up fouls. You have to know when to go all out, and when to hold back. Many people hated him, but no one could deny the Pure Hustle of Dennis Rodman. Rodman has 4329 career Offensive Rebounds, 611 career Steals and 531 career Blocks. They aren’t the best numbers around, but when you input them with his 1481 career turnovers and 2843 career fouls he manages a Pure Hustle rating of 1.80. This may not look like much, but for a frame of reference, Paul Millsap (what most current Jazz fans think Pure Hustle is all about) has managed a career Pure Hustle value of 1.24. So if Paul Millsap is giving 110% out there, Dennis Rodman is giving 155% out there.

 3. Shooting Worth (SW): This is an easy one, because it already exists on many website by it’s other name “Points per Shot” (PPS). It’s just how many total points you get (including free throws) divided by the number of shots (FGA) you take. Sure, there’s some points that may be unrepresented by FGA (like technical fouls, or being in the bonus), but the fact that the player is involved in those free throws is a benefit that they get for being good shooters. The idea is that if you take a shot it’s worth two points, right? Well, that doesn’t always work out in the PROs, and the league average (or mean for all player data) is 1.22. [Yes, I looked at every shot in the L last year on ESPN.com] So, in effect, you have a positive Shooting Worth if you are better than average, and have a SW greater than 1.22 – of course, you can still be good at your job if you have a lower value; you’d just be below league average. That’s the crux of this statistic – it seems to display individuals who take good shots, and this stat can be used to better differentiate between guys who score a high ppg who take good shots, or the guys who shoot a lot in order to get good stats.

Example: Allen Iverson has been a phenomenal scorer in his career. He’s averaged over 30 ppg on four separate occasions, and even with his no-show last year his career average is still 27.1 ppg. That’s a really great average, but how does that really stack up against a guy who averages something similar, but shoots much better than 42.5 fg%? Well, when you input Iverson's 23983 total career points over his 19,590 total shots you see that his actual Shooting Worth is 1.22 – which is exactly average. He’s not a “better” scorer than some of his contemporaries, he’s just a volume scorer. Karl Malone only has a career scoring average that’s in the 25 points per game range – but unlike Ivey, Karl was much better than average when it came to the quality of his shots; Karl’s Shooting Worth was 1.41 (better than lots of other known scorers like Kobe, Jerry West and Glen Rice, to name a few). From this we can conclude that a shot by Allen Iverson was, in effect, worth less than a shot by Karl – Karl was taking better shots.

 4. Shot Frequency (SF): Some websites try to find out often a player shoots and they represent it by the number of shots / value of time (usually minutes). I don’t know what 0.282 shots looks like, so that representation means little to me. I would rather look at the same data in another way, namely, how many minutes of burn does a player need before he jacks up a shot. Some guys start shooting the ball as soon as they are on the court, while others spend a lot of time on the court – but don’t shoot the ball. In effect, this stat (Shot Frequency) will be able to identify if a certain player is gun shy to a fault (some would say that John Stockton was) or a pure, unashamed jacker of shots (too many to name). In this case, the lower the number means a higher frequency of shots . . . because the number represented is the time needed on the floor between shots. To find this out we divide the total minutes played by the number of Field Goals attempted (FGA).

Example: Let’s continue talking about Iverson here. Most of his life he’s been the first option on offense … a guy that the rest of the team made way for. As a result, he spent a lot of his career shooting the ball. How often does he shoot? Well, he’s played in 36719 minutes and taken 19690 total field goal attempts in that time. If you input the data it reveals that Allen Iverson, for his career, will shot the ball once every 1.865 minutes he’s on the floor. To be honest, this is the highest frequency I’ve seen in all my months ‘beta testing’ these statistics. 1.865 minutes is every 1:52 of actual game time. So that means if he plays 35 minutes in a game he’ll shoot the ball nearly 19 times. For a point of reference another Hall of Fame type “point guard” is John Stockton, who shot the ball once every 3.497 minutes (once ever 3:30 of game time). If given the same amount of time (35 minutes), Stockton would shoot the ball 10 times. (Really, 10 times, 10.008 is pretty darn accurate!) That’s almost half as many shots as Iverson . . . and effectively, half as frequent.

This statistic helps us understand which guys really shoot the ball the most, and most likely, are the primary offensive options for any given team. (Though, some anomalies exist, like Matt Harpring who shoots the ball very frequently for a guy with his skills – he shot the ball more often than some guys who started over him during his career)

Gestalt Offense (GO): This is the biggie. I’ve fretted over this for days and days and finally am prepared to release it upon an unwitting population. It’s not perfect, and it seems to only work best with larger sample sizes (a seasons’ worth of data, or a road trip, may look fine – any singular game can break it). It really favors guards and only really works best for players who played in a modern-ish era (one where turnovers, offensive rebounds and other similar statistics were actually recorded). The basis for this was to isolate how much pressure certain players could place on the defense. What a player does on offense (when it comes to stats) can be either one of five things: he can assist on a score, he can get to the foul line, he can take a shot, he can be called for a turn over, or he can grab and offensive rebound. There are no stats for setting solid screens, or anything like the ‘hockey assist’ right now with how the stats are kept. So the statistic is already limited, but I try to do the best with the data that I have. Essentially the GO Rating is the summation of a player’s modified assists, free throw opportunities, offensive rebounding ability, penchant for scoring against their turnovers, all over the number of games a player has played:

Of course, it’s a lot more complicated than that . . .

The first, and most straight forward, part of the equation is assists. This equation not only values assists higher than their normal value ( 2.23 > 1, after all), but it also serves to give a bonus to good passers, and penalize poor passers. (Good or poor depending on if they have a high Assist to Turnover Ratio) The first standard value here is 2.23. Where did this value come from? Well, it’s the true value of an assist when you balance it for the ratio of assisted 2PTFG vs. 3PTFG. (According to the stats on ESPN.com, where all the major stats came from, aside from archived player stats from Basketball-Reference.com) The second standard number is 1.48, this is the mean Assist to Turnover ratio for teams in the NBA. (Room for improvement exists here if I could actually find the mean Assist to Turnover ratio for the players) As it stands how good you are at passing (vs. turning it over) affects how many total points you get from this category. After all, Tim Hardaway may be able to get you 37 assists on a road trip, but those 37 assists would be better than 37 assists from Alonzo Mourning because Zo would pick up quite a few more turnovers along the way.

Free throws are simple enough to understand now that we’ve gone through assists. Here we don’t look at how many free throws an individual has made, as the point of the GO rating was to see the type of pressure that an offensive player puts on the defense. Instead the focus is to see how many free throw attempts the player gets. Of course the catch is that value for FGA is modified by how good a shooter you are compared to the league average (which is 77%). A guy like José Manuel Calderón may only go to the line half the time as someone like Shaq – but Shaq is below average and Jose above average to the point that the difference in points from this category are not as large as we would think. Again, like in assists, it’s a bonus to good shooters and penalty to those who are not so hot from the line. In effect, you want your best free throw shooters at the line, their FTA are then worth more than that of guys who do not go to the line with as much confidence as they do.

Rebounding is easy. I figured that in the grand scheme of things, an Offensive Rebound is worth 1.16 points. I based this on how a Turnover is 1.3 points (see below), how an assist is 2.23 points and how points are worth, well, points. This is a modifier. The second modifier is similar to previous categories. Before we looked at if the player was better than average at Assist to turnover ratio, and then how they fared in FT% against the mean. Here we see that 26.73% of the total rebounds in the NBA were offensive rebounds. If you are a better than average offensive rebounder then you get a bonus here, if you are worse, then you get a negative modifier (as seen as a number less than 1.0, but not a negative number, per se). This part of the equation really seems to get broken if used on Charles Barkley (who, if you look at just one game, would get some crazy number of points in this section because he had 11 offensive rebounds and 5 defensive ones). Thankfully this section self-neuters itself if you have zero offensive rebounds.

Man, where do I begin with this one? Well, we went over Shot Frequency already. We divide 33.6 (representing 33.6 minutes of action for an elite player) by the player’s own Shot Frequency. This tells us how many shots he will put up if given Starter type of minutes. The next step is adding 1 to the Effective Field Goal Percentage (eFG%). This is so that we get a positive value with the percentage when multiplied. Why use eFG% instead of just regular FG%? Well, eFG% adds into account three point shots, and the higher degree of difficulty of shooting from that distance. (For more info on eFG% click here) This step tries to even things out a bit. The third part is how the player’s Shot Worth (also described earlier) rates compared to the league average for Shot Worth (or PPS). If you are Malone-like, you get a nice bonus here, if you are Iverson-like, you don’t get a bonus, and if you are really poor, then you get a penalty. The last part is the total points scored by the individual, divided by 10. Ten was one of the first numbers I used that seemed to make things work out when I was fiddling around. I don’t know if this last section of the Shooting section is legit or not yet, I remember when I tried this out without the last part that individuals would be getting very little from this part of the equation. At some stage you have to factor in how many points a guys scores, even if you are looking are how well they shoot.

Uhhhh, so this is very easy to understand. I’m not going to mention anything more than that this value is subtracted from the rest of the section values in the numerator. Don’t forget to divide everything by the total number of games, ya here!

Man, I’m super duper tired, so I’m just going to go ahead and post this. Give me feedback, tell me I’m crazy and set me straight. I think we need mores stats, and unfortunately, the lack of defensive categories means I can’t make a Defensive GO rating type of stat. I’m open to changing my formulas and re-working things. If you want I can e-mail you the spread sheet that contains the Macro that calculates these new stats. (I got really sick and tired of calculating the GO Rating by hand with pen and paper.)

I will probably make another post on the Go Rating in the future, filled with examples of players, and how they rated. So far I’ve seen that eFG%, Total Points, Assist to turnover ratio and a few other factors really seem to hinder bigmen, while giving guards and other wing players a boost. For the record, Magic Johnson’s GO Rating is 102.241, and he is the gold standard . . . some guys score higher than he does, while others politely fall into place. (Jordan is at 120, Karl Malone at 83, and so forth.)

Contract years, Developing Talent & Front Office Subterfuge

The work of a General Manager is easy to criticize, yet hard to fully quantify. Team owners are like dragons sleeping on their hoard of gold coins and other priceless treasures. Coaches want to build winning resumes. Players want to get paid. The GM has to be the go-between that gets all these parties (with differing motivations) on the same page. The GM has to get a coach the players he needs to win. The players want the promises they need before signing on the dotted line (salary, role, playing time, etc). And for the team owner, well, the GM has to placate this obstacle on a near daily basis and convince the owners not to devourer the GM on sight -- while suggesting that parting with part of their hoard (on the 1st and 15th of each month) is the smart thing to do.

At times the NBA can be distilled to purer components, of winning and losing, and of the honesty of the game. Yet, at other times the NBA can expand into a complex juggling act more akin to micromanagement in a strategy game, or a RTS click-fest. For players, the game is the game. It's simple in that way, and relies on skill, speed and quick reflexes -- a Video Game analogy would be the first person shooter. For coaches, it's series of complex decisions, not unlike the original turn based strategy game called "Chess". (you may have heard of it) The GM, though, has to delve into the previously mentioned RTS click-fest:

But instead, imagine dealing with salaries, egos, scouts, coaches, players and injuries . . . also less cannons, probably . . .

*Ahem* Back to the point . . . a GM's job is rarely done perfectly because of how difficult it tends to be. Some GM's are great talent evaluators (for example, there's Isiah Thomas, just look at the player's he has drafted in his career, most of them have been All-Stars or award winners in some regard: Vince Carter, Tracy McGrady, Marcus Camby, Damon Stoudamire, David Lee, and so on) but poor on other sides of their job description. Other GM's have good connections with other teams, and always seem to do business with them (look at Kevin O'Connor and all the deals he has made with Philly over the years). Some GM's are really good with managing money, while others are known for turning things around in short order. At the end of the day, though, the GM is a salesman. He is essentially selling his services to a consumer -- in this case the team owner. Part of sales is to buy low and sell high. Another part of sales is to be consciously deceptive in just what your wares are. That last part does not really apply fully to the GM - Team Owner relationship, but rather to the GM to GM relationship. Sometimes you get a lemon, but you have to pass it off as a safe family sedan. Other times you (as the GM) are working not against the team owner, the other GM's, but the actual assets -- the players and their agents.

You want to keep a good player on your team for the least amount of money it's going to take to keep him there. All Team Owners expect the GM to be able to do such a thing. This part of the job ties in directly with the buy low/sell high and deceptive doctrines. If the first step is acquiring a player (via a Trade, Free Agency or the Draft), then the next step is evaluating that player (though, we hope that some evaluations have taken place before the player is traded for/signed/drafted). The next logical step would be to give playing time to that player and develop him. The last step? Making a decision on that guy -- sign him again when his contract expires, trade him, or let him walk. Parts of the last step depend greatly on each of the previous steps.

• For example, say the team acquires player A. They evaluate him, see some things they like, some things he needs to improve on, and play him accordingly. He either gets better or worse. If he does well, he becomes more valuable to the team -- and more valuable as a player. His asking price may go up, and making the last step (in this case: deciding to keep him) harder to do. An example of this Jazz fans may be familiar with would be All-Star Mo Williams.
• Player B, on the other hand, does not appear to have much upside, does not make the most of his chances on the court, and is not in the future plans of the team. They can get rid of him in a variety of ways, the team's disinterest in retaining him opens up options for his removal. An example of this Jazz fans may be familiar with would be Kris Humphries.

It's not always this simple, though.

• What about Player C . . . the team that drafts him knows him best, and knows that there is hidden potential deep inside. If they go about normally giving him playing time, allow him to develop openly (instead of only during closed practices and workouts with the team), then other GM's may wish to pry him away. Even if the original team wishes to keep him, retaining him may become very difficult as the exposure led to quicker development, which led to a greater player value. This would be repeating the same mistake with Player A all over again. What if, instead, the team decides to develop him secretly, give him less exposure, drive his asking price down, remove interest other GMs would have in him, and basically, keep him on the "down low".

This is pretty much the only way to retain those people that you think *can* blow up (in a good way), without having to give them a lot of money to make them stay. Deron Williams deserves the contract he got. It's an expensive contract though. Some teams are forced to over-pay to retain their talent (don't need to look farther than a young, uninjured Andrei Kirilenko half a decade ago). In general, you want to avoid doing that. If anything, I think we can clearly place the curious case of C.J. Miles as an example of a Player C scenario.

At the end of C.J.'s first season he was getting more playing time, and in the last game of the season he played really well. How well? 23 points (8/13 fg, 2/5 3pt, 5/8 ft), 6 rebounds, 4 assists, 2 blocks, 1 steal -- as a rookie with extend playing time playing against a tough Western Conference team. Every off-season since then there have been fishy things going on. He was a consistent no-show in future summer leagues, but instead opted to work on his game by himself. During times of injury he would be pressed into the starting line-up, only to return to the end of the bench only a few days later. C.J. should have played more than he did in when he was on his rookie contract. The clock struck 12 on C.J.'s contract though, and the Jazz simply put themselves in a situation to match whatever contract someone threw his way by virtue of him being a restricted free agent. No one really bit, not knowing what they would be getting . . . until Oklahoma City offered him a 4 year $15 million dollar contract. We all know how that story ended, as the Jazz eventually matched. Was $3.75 million per season too much for C.J. Miles? Perhaps . . . but at the same time, it's a lot less than it could have been had C.J. been playing like he is now at this time last season. (or perhaps, getting the playing time that he is getting now at this time last season) Back then I thought the Jazz were (in chronological order) a) not developing C.J. enough, b) using him only for spot duty, c) giving his playing time to guys who did not deserve it.

This season Ceejay has been everything from a solid deep threat, a versatile 2nd option on offense, to invisible . . . sometimes all in the same week. This is his 4th season in the league, and his first where he has averaged over 11.5 mpg. I'm sure he would be better, more seasoned player than he currently is if he was playing 20 mpg every season after his rookie campaign. I'm also pretty sure that he wouldn't be on the Jazz then. In effect, one could directly point to a systematic way in which the Jazz brass (Sloan and O'Connor mostly) lowered interest in a prospect, sequestered him from exposure (he only got one short stint in the NBA DL), yet did not develop him for fear of losing him. At the end of the day the Jazz have C.J., but not the C.J. he could be right now, and C.J. is not earning as much as he perhaps thought he would be after his rookie contract expired.

The Jazz financial situation is horrible right now. If it does not improve shortly than there may be a few more Player A type situations in the future with key contributors Paul Millsap and Ronnie Brewer. The Jazz would love to keep them for reasonable contracts, though their development (and production) have elicited quite a bit of exposure. Good for their bank accounts, perhaps not so great for the Jazz.

That's where the micromanagement comes back into play. You want your players to be good, productive and develop . . . but you do not want to lose them to other teams after you put in all the hard work to make them useful. Gilbert Arenas comes to mind, he was drafted, developed, and then left to get paid in free agency. Right now the Jazz are playing the "front office subterfuge game" with some other young players that could possibly be helping the Jazz right now.

Morris Almond: He is a scorer's scorer, who despite having limited quickness and has played defense only once in his life, could be doing a whole lot more for this Jazz team. He's looked horrible in his rookie season with the Jazz where he never got to be involved in the plays that the regular rotation run that get swingmen easy buckets. He didn't play a minute with Deron Williams last year, and was relegated to garbage time spot up shooting from the corner. Reason for not getting playing time: He's behind a few key guys on the depth chart and doesn't rebound or defend as well as others. For some reason this has prevented him from playing one single second in the NBA-DL this season. Something fishy: Why hasn't he played in the D-League at all this season then, if there's no space for him on our current roster? Do the Jazz know that he's a raw gem that only seems to look better when he gets to play?  Utah is healthy now, so there's no real risk to put him in the game at all . . . maybe practice with the Jazz is better than games with the Flash? Or maybe they don't want him to get too much exposure right now? Utah has opted not to extend his contract, so seemingly he is out . . . but maybe they are trying to keep his going rate low so that they *can* still have a shot at retaining him for a while. After all, they scouted him, interviewed him, drafted him, are developing him . . . Harpring's contract expires next year, and the Jazz will need a wing player who can come off that Harpring curl and hit the mid-range jumper. Financial situation aside, that sounds like something the Jazz have in their laps right now with Almond. Alas, this is exactly not the contract type of year a young player wants to have (being buried on the bench). Co-incidentally, this is exactly the type of contract year the Jazz would want him to have . . . after all, they did the same thing with Ceejay, they know what they are doing.

Kyrylo Fesenko: Very large man (7'1, 300+ lbs.) with the same wingspan and standing reach as Greg Oden -- yet uninjured and a capable passer and interior defender who has, due to injuries, been pressed into defending the likes of Yao Ming to Andrew Bynum . . . and done so well. Very likely that he is more talented than the guy ahead of him on the depth chart (Jarron Collins), but lacks experience, familiarity with the system and seasoning. Reason for not getting playing time: Work ethic and personality appear to anchor this man to the bench, though at some level talent and ability should trump that. Something fishy: As a rookie, this wet behind the ears, 2nd round draft pick center joined the Jazz and played in 70 games, and played over 20 mpg. This player joined a playoff team that was contending for a championship. This player had no experience with the Jazz system prior (as a rookie) and ended up getting playing time over a limited, soft center who had much more experience in the system. This young player was Jarron Collins. What, did you think I was talking about Fesenko? Heck no, Fesenko has played only 200 minutes with the Jazz in his 2 year career, let alone played in 70 (@ 20 per) as a rookie. Why is there such a disparity between Collins' and Fesenko's early careers? I don't know, but it seems kind of fishy to me. Even more fishy is that Fes only had one stint in the NBA-DL this season (8 games), promptly did exactly what we'd want him to do (be a defensive presence who rebounded, blocked and changed shots, shot a high percentage and eventually was averaging a double double) . . . and was called back and never played again. Ever. Hmmmm . . . he improves, shows that he's good at what he does . . . and can be a free agent this season . . . 'need to reel that big boy in, and hide him somewhere!' (which was the original plan with drafting a little known, poorly scouted player from a minor European league in the first place) More so than Almond, I think that Fesenko has a future with the Jazz, or at the very least, in the NBA somewhere as teams always want size, and if the guy is talented, he's going to get a contract somewhere. If you gave him the playing time, I'm pretty sure that he'd be able to get Rookie Millsap type of numbers for sure.

Paul Millsap: Speaking of the 'Sap, he got some great exposure this season. He produced as a starter due to injuries to Carlos Boozer. He's a free agent, and he's going to get paid this off-season. No doubt about it. Interestingly enough, at the first whiff of a hobbled, rusty Carlos Boozer the Jazz sent 'Sap back to the bench and as his fantasy owners know firsthand, 'Sap just hasn't been the same since. Reason for being sent to the bench: Boozer was the starter before he got injured, the Jazz/Sloan doctrine on this is that you cannot lose your starting job due to injury. Something fishy: No one said anything about a starting job, but just let Paul start the first 4-5 games after Boozer comes back and then let Boozer slowly work his way back into playing shape, and then give Boozer the starting spot. A lot of teams do this, they bring a starter back from injury on the bench just to test things out a bit. Out of all of my conspiracies, this is among the weakest -- though I don't see why the Jazz didn't keep starting Millsap for 4 games while Boozer (who was playing limited minutes) worked his way back into starting shape. For one thing, this almost looks like a directed attempt to reduce Millsap's exposure (for the open market). It's probably not, but it just looks fishy -- during a contract year, no less.

Kosta Koufos: Let's just say that if this 19 year old was playing Brook Lopez type of minutes on a bad team we'd see Brook Lopez-ish production out of Kosta. Yet, a guy who is clearly more talented than Collins, and is a very hard worker (much more than Fesenko has shown), is completely lost on this team. Kosta isn't on the active roster right now, isn't playing in the development league, and isn't developing. Reason for not getting playing time: Apparently he doesn't know the plays. Sure, he's a smart shot blocking 7 footer who has a nice offensive game AND is a very hard worker who hustles . . . but he's not going to get to play because by playing him he would then be in a position to actually learn the plays, and then we would have even less of an excuse for why he isn't playing. He's almost a gestalt character that takes the size (mostly) and shot blocking of Fess, with the hustle and work ethic of Collins . . . and gets none of the playing time that he should. Something fishy: There is no good reason not to play this guy, develop him with real NBA minutes, or even send him to the NBA D-League for some in game action. He hasn't seen the developmental league at all in his career, instead getting better by wearing suits next to Carlos Boozer for 50+ games. That's another thing, he got some very minor playing time just because of injuries . . . this season was a prime season to be forced into playing and developing younger talent. Sloan had to work many games without being able to call on veteran bigmen . . . but still he elected to instead play Matt Harpring at power forward. Huh?

It's not that difficult to imagine that the Jazz are hurting their futures by risking not getting these guys playing time because they do not want to lose them to other teams . . . but they also get nothing out of these guys. Other teams play younger players during the regular season so that they may become contributors to that team . . . and even help them in the playoffs. Heck, our team did this with Paul Millsap as a rookie, or Shandon Anderson (more on him later), or Bryon Russell and a host of others. There's no doubt in my mind that if Fess of Kosta were getting 12-15 mpg this season that one of them would be able to contribute in the playoffs for us. Instead the development time has become much longer for a bunch of guys who could be helping us now. Also, it's not that difficult to imagine that the Jazz are hurting the values of their players by flat out burying them during contract years. No playing time = no exposure and no stats = bargain prices. They did this with C.J., and if they had a time machine, would probably like to do so with others as well.

The way that the Jazz develop talent seems to be highly unequal. Some young guys get regular burn, while others don't. This time is directly proportional towards development. I think that Jazz Brass feel the financial side to all of this needs to take precedence over the immediate development and returns from the players on the roster. The Jazz gave good minutes to a solid player (Shandon Anderson) as a rookie, and eventually left the team, the Jazz get nothing in the long term for it. The Jazz gave good minutes to a very talented player (Andrei Kirilenko), and end up having to really over-pay to keep him on the team. The Jazz don't want to get into anything like that again, and now underplay most guys during the span of their rookie contracts, so they they do not have to over-pay.

C.J., only after the Jazz matched an offer he got from another team, is finally getting playing time -- but as a 4th year guard with the potential that he had when he was drafted, he is behind where he should be. They seem to be guilty of doing that with Almond and Fesenko by not playing them in the NBA, nor allowing them to rack up stats in the D-League . . . which would have been a great way to audition for other teams during contract years -- or you know, actually get better and be able to help OUR team.

Some Jazz apologists feel like the practices the Jazz have are of greater value to a younger player than actually playing in the development league, or even playing in the NBA on poorer quality teams. I think that this is a very haughty thing to say . . . especially with how closely the Jazz *can* keep an eye on things with their development team being only a few miles away and the coach of that team is related to Jerry Sloan -- it almost seems like a no-brainer to send the kids down at least once each when none of them are even on the active roster with the Jazz. They threw C.J. a bone once by doing that, by giving him a chance to play, and that improved his morale. Why not do the same for a younger player this season? Sloan even goes out to harp on how great the D-League is, and how he wishes they had that when he first came into the league. If it's so great, why not use it, now that the rest of the guys are healthy?

As for how great the Jazz practices are . . . they rarely get a chance to practice on the road (they only practice on days off, and now at the end of the season, with the playoffs coming up, there may be less than the regular number of practices on off-days), so the younglings are getting even less time to improve than normal. This clearly is the case where the GM, at the behest of saving the team owner money, works with the coaches to screw the players out of money / job satisfaction. Or maybe that's by design, especially in their contract years?

News Headlines - The calm before the storm

Can you believe that it's almost October? Really? We're less than half a month away and more and more NBA news will be coming in the near future. [point of reference: us bloggers have lamented how boring the Month of August was, imagine how bereft of information it will be in those non-Olympic years!] Anyway, here is a quick rundown of some Jazz related stories:

* The Dominator is ubiquitous -- Deron Williams is "The Man" of this team, and lives in SLC full time, and as a result, he's been busy there full time giving back to the community, read about in the Desert Morning News! "When Williams first appeared in Utah, he was confident but guarded. Charles Barkley he wasn't. But as time passed, he became increasingly willing to show his humor. Sometimes it's simply a glint in his eye or a short one-liner. For those he trusts, he's engaging and cooperative, the proverbial good guy. Which raises the obvious question: What's in it for him? Is this some kind of radical publicity blitz? Probably not, since he had already signed his contract extension before most of this happened. "We didn't just sit down and say, 'Deron, we've got to come up with a major media crash course,' like we're promoting a movie," said Wright. "It's not like that. People were calling and saying, 'Can you go here?' And a lot of it, if it fit into his schedule, we did." Wright says Williams also did it because he understands he's the Jazz's guy. His team, his town, his responsibility. Which is quite unusual. The team has three players who have been All-Stars (Boozer, Kirilenko and Mehmet Okur), yet the most popular, and the unchallenged leader, is Williams." (Brad Rock, 2008, Deseret News)

 

* Steve Luhm (of the Salt Lake Tribune) talks about the 2010 Draft pick that we own, and how the improvement of the New York Knicks may reduce what looked like a for sure lock at a Top 5 pick in that draft. "The Knicks weren't going anywhere under Isiah Thomas and the Jazz's chances of being in the top five or top 10 of the 2010 draft with the pick previously acquired from New York would have improved had he stayed in charge. The hiring of Donnie Walsh as team president and Mike D'Antoni as coach is first step toward respectability for the Knicks, which is not good news for the Jazz. Walsh's track record and reputation are impeccable. He's one of the best in the business and was the perfect choice to direct the reconstruction in New York. D'Antoni? I've known him since he was hired as Denver's director of player personnel in 1997. During the lockout-shortened 1999 season, D'Antoni inherited the impossible job of head coach and guided the Nuggets to a 14-36 record. He was not retained, but got a second chance to be an NBA head coach in Phoenix, starting early in the 2003-04 season. Everybody who follows the NBA knows what kind of job D'Antoni did with the Suns." (Luhm, 2008, Salt Lake Tribune)

 

* AK back to Russia, for reals this time, people! -- People love to jump to unreasonable conclusions, as a story grows exponentially with each blog that links to it, and gives their take -- I read this blog post from "The Hoop" from a variety of sources (ballhype and dimemag) today, and Dime even goes the distance to suggest that solving the financial burden in Utah is as easy as shipping AK off to CSKA Moscow (reading jazzfanz much?)-- because of their "reported" interest in him. Didn't they have 'reported' interest in Ben Gordon too? How did that work out? The Hoop reports from somewhere else (krepsinis.net?) that this can be a done deal, and that it may have some weight because Andrei hasn't renewed his contract with the Utah Jazz yet. First of all, it's good to check your sources.

There are a few places on the net that show these financial facts quite easily . . . Andrei is under contract for three more seasons @ $15 million, $16.5 million and $17.8 million. So not only is AK not able to renew his contract (as it's not expiring), but this means that CSKA would have to buy out his contract from the Jazz (much like how when NBA teams have to buy out contracts from big dogs across the pond, it works both ways guys). This guy (Anthony) said it best:

"I mean, CSKA's got money, but I don't know if they have 3 years/50 mil of buyout money to go along with a similar sized contract. His wife has a shop in Salt Lake, he's good friends with the other Eastern European dudes on the team, and he has one of the best point guards in the league (and if Boozer bolts he'd become his preferred target). Something tells me that this won't happen.

Scratch that, everything tells me that this won't happen."  (comment from The Hoop article, 2008)

 

* Training camp Tid-bits -- It basically starts on September 29th with media day (yes, we'll get to find out what hair color Fesenko currently has, or if Kover finally got that 'Thugg Life' tattoo he kept suggesting that he'd get over the summer), then they're off to Boise from September 30th to October 3rd. (Mark your calendar, Masha!)

When this happens each year I think of Jerry Sloan telling all the players that for that point in time that he's going to be their daddies, and that he forces integration by having unlikely pals to room mate together -- like, a few seasons ago we may have had Greg Ostertag sharing a room with DeShawn Stevenson. Okay, sure, my entire concept of Jazz training camp is like that sequence from "Remember the Titans".

Just fast-forward to the 3:30 mark if you don't want to watch all of this, the best part (the part I'm talking about) starts at 6:30 . . .anyway . . . the first pre-season game is against the Lakers on October 7th in Anaheim. Woo!

 

* Trickle down economics means that during an energy crisis air travel is more expensive . . . duh. Thanks for showing up Jasen Lee.