These aren’t John Hollinger’s dad’s statistics

Okay, I love direct observational research as much as the other guy, but as someone firmly rooted in the sciences (aka. wasting my life in college and beyond), I love quantifiable results. As a result, I find that statistics are vital towards observing, categorizing and understanding the environment that we inhabit (and share with other organisms). Stats are awesome, and I love them (I got 98% in stats in university) . Though, I know that stats can be manipulated and abused – furthermore, statistics do not fully explain the entire situation, nor do sufficient statistics exist that can approach a full knowledge of a hybrid (not just numerical) system.

We can attempt to use statistics to better understand basketball – and as a fan, and non-paid analyst, I’m not alone in this point of view (just check out the Wages of Wins sometime). That said, the statistics that we currently have in basketball are not complete. No current stats exist to fully describe all possible positive actions on the court (e.g. there’s no stat for a defender breaking / slipping a screen and staying on his man, despite the set play run by the offense). Also, some stats that would be useful are just not recorded in the NBA (e.g. in the Adriatic league their stats also include things like how many times a player has their shot blocked, or how many times a player draws a foul – don’t you want to know how many times Dirk gets stuffed, or how many fouls Shaq drew per game during his peak?).

Right now there aren’t enough stats to fully map out good play, and some of the stats that we do have appear to mean more than they actually do! A steal means that a defender has disrupted the offense to the point that a turnover has occurred – many guards and swingmen get steals. The bigman analog has always been blocks, but the most important part of the steal (aka, the change of actual possession of the ball) is lost in a block. Often a blocked shot prevents a made basket, but does not always give possession back to the defending side. In effect, a blocked shot that still gives the ball back to the offense is no better than a defender causing a deflection of a pass where the ball goes out of bounds – and the offensive team retains possession.

Deflections are the most important stat that continues to not be officially counted by the NBA; on one hand it would be difficult to adjudicate (when is it a block? when is it a deflection?), but on the other hand, deflections often lead to other stats. The guy who picks up a ball that’s deflected out of the hand of the ball carrier is rewarded with a steal – but the guy who got the ball out of the ball carrier’s hand (the deflector) doesn’t get credited for causing the play. I think that’s kind of unfair.

In fact the guy who defends well frequently gets jobbed out of a good stat. For years I’ve seen a solid defensive play in the paint by a center (straight up single coverage that results in his man taking a shot – and missing) be recorded as a GREAT defensive board by the power forward (who wasn’t defending anyone, he just happened to get the rebound off of someone else's good defense). I’ve seen this happen on all levels of play. If anything, it prove the limitations of stats, and the limitations of the stats to accurately reward defense.

It’s no secret that defense is way harder to grade by using stats alone. Firstly, there are not enough defensive stats (like the guy who can navigate through a number screens and gets back in time to contest/change a shot gets the same amount of stats as another play who doesn’t even go through the screens and lets his man take an open jumper), and secondly, the stats that do exist do not always mean great defense. A very quick guy like Allen Iverson spent years on the court playing in the passing lanes. This is him gambling on defense to get steals. It’s exciting when a guy does get those break away steals in the game – but it’s not sound, fundamental man defense. Really, this play is sorely discouraged in the case where there isn’t a big shot blocker in the paint to clean up any mess that an unguarded PG getting into the paint can cause.

I know – I’ve seen John Stockton make these same type of ‘Defensive Back’ style steals because he had big Mark Eaton (two time defensive player of the year – once had close to 500 blocks in a season) watching his back. Iverson had the same with Theo Ratliff and Dikembe Mutombo. Chris Paul is another player who benefits from being backed up by shot blocking force of nature Tyson Chandler. If guys like Stockton, Iverson and Paul had Mehmet Okur and Jarron Collins laying down the law in the paint behind them you can be sure that the head coach would have told them to defend their man more, and gamble on defense less.

Over the years I’ve been lucky enough to coach some basketball on the youth developmental level. We tried to go past the lack of collected stats on defense in order to quantify good play on both sides of the ball. An attempt was made to count the number of times the player defending a shooter resulted in that shooter missing. Other times we tried to record good traps on the ball carrier, or how many times the defender harassed the ball handler into turning the ball over. These types of things can be recorded but by far the best defense I’ve ever seen on any level is that where the man being defended does not ever get the ball, entry passes are denied, position is denied, and when he does get the ball – he’s in such a disadvantageous point that he cannot positively help his team when he has the ball. You know what kind of stats that guy gets – for playing the best defense? He gets nothing for it. There is no reward for him that shows up on the boxcore – and this is a failure in terms of statistics being used to categorize and enumerate good play in a game. But if he manages to tip an errantly passed ball that he forces the guy he’s defending into attempting(because he can’t shoot it where he is), the team mate who picks up the ball gets credited for a steal.

Oh yeah, that’s basically it for defense in the NBA, I talked about the fallacy that defensive boards is akin to good defense, I talked about how blocks may stop a shot, but do not give you possession of the ball all that time, and I talked about how steals can be indicative of poor defense, not good defense. (Of course, exceptions to these rules always exist – it is good defense to control a tough defensive rebound that’s contested, or to block a shot to a team mate, or to single handedly strip a guy that  you are defending. But let’s not forget that these instances of good defense are counted just as much as the same stats that are products of situational defense. A ball that rolls do you on defense counts just like a ball that you fought for.)

The long and short of it is that we need more stats – especially on defense. If you’ve read this far down then you are awesome . . . because I’ve tried to make some ‘new’ stats. Some people are good enough for simple points, rebounds, assists, steals and blocks. That’s fine for a casual fantasy basketball league . . . but not good enough if you really watch the game like your life depends on it. I wish there were more stats, and more ways to reward good play – but right now the NBA does not appear to give us things like that (instead the +/- stat is thrown to us, like it means anything). Anyway, I’ve tried to make some new stats and here are five calculations that you can even do at home (studio audience of old ladies says ‘ooooohh’, already put in a receptive mood because of the deal that they got on that juicer they just purchased):

1. Defensive Gambling (DG): This stat is pretty easy – I try to recognize that some of the stats that people get on defense are related to gambling on some level. (Gambling in a passing lane, gambling by leaving your man to get a weak side shot block, gambling by trying to strip a man when the ref is right there, and so forth) We already had blocks and steals . . . but they exist in a world without accumulated risks. The risk here, of course, exists as a foul being called – another stat that we already have. The fun part is balancing the risks vs. the rewards.

The Foul is the base for this equation – as it means that you tried a risky move and you got burned. Not only do you have a penalty against you, but it directly benefits the offensive team. A steal, on the other hand, is a situation where a player takes a risk, is rewarded – and the offensive team is directly disadvantaged. When a team misses a three pointer and the opposing team gets the ball and scores a layup that is a 5 point swing. A steal does not directly mean you gain points, but you directly prevent the chance of points – it’s not a 5 point swing, but it’s a possession swing. I say that this is worth 1.5 fouls, in terms of risk/reward. A block does not guarantee such a similar swing in terms of possession (it does sometimes though), but while a steal only prevents the potential of a shot being taken, a block directly affects shots that are taken. (It’s a shame there’s no stat for shots changed, because a good shot blocker has an aura that surrounds him that changes many shots – for example when players started to scout Kirilenko his blocks went way down . . . but he was changing the same number of net shots as guys changed their shots to avoid getting blocked by him) A block, then, is not as good as a steal, but it’s still good – a block is equal to 1.3 fouls. The full equation for Defensive Gambling is as follows:

Example: In 2003-2004 Andrei Kirilekno was healthy (at this point in his career, he had played in 240 of a total possible 246 games), getting playing time (37.1 mpg), and happy. That season Andrei had 215 blocked shots and 150 steals against 174 fouls. His Defensive Gambling score was astronomical that season. DG = [ ( 215 * 1.3) + (150 * 1.5) ] / 174 DG = [ 279.5 + 225 ] / 174 DG = 3.002893563 So that means that Andrei was gambling at a very fortuitous rate – he’d get away with gambling three times before he would get burned once. If you extrapolate that to how many fouls he averaged per game that season you can see that he was doing something right with all that time on the court. Because the haters probably want to know, Andrei’s career average DG score is 2.25. For a point of reference, Scottie Pippen’s career DG score is 1.41 – and Pip is the prototypical wing defender who made 10 All-Defensive teams in his career. Pippen had way more steals, but he took way too many poor gambles as well. Pippen has 6 seasons where he’s averaged greater than 3 fouls per game. Andrei has none in his career. So put that in your pipe and smoke it!

Clearly looking at things like blocks and steals on their own gives a skewed view of the world – putting it against a risk/reward system is a better frame of reference that we can use to see which players make smart gambles, and which ones do not. Andrei – for all his faults – has a good Defensive Gambling ability if you ask me.

2. Pure Hustle (PH): Pure hustle builds off of the Defensive Gambling equation, but adds more chances for risks and more chances for rewards. Here we see Blocks, Steals and Offensive Rebounds go against Turnovers and Persona Fouls. The common factor for hustle is a turn over. It’s the most benign result of hustle. Too much hustle can result in a foul – which hurts you and your team. This is why a foul is worth more. On the good side of things, hustle can result in good defense, or a second effort (or third, or fourth) on offense. We all remember Tayshawn Prince robbing Reggie Miller with a game winning block. We should all remember Bird stealing the inbounds from Isiah. And we all know that second chance shots can not only allow you to score from an advantageous position – but also result in scores themselves. This is why I think when it comes to hustle, Offensive Rebounds are worth the most, with Blocks and Steals being on equal footing with fouls.

Example: When people think of hustle they are apt to think of garbage guys who don’t have much skill. That type of scrappy play can result in solid contributions for a team, but I think hustle is more than just effort. Hustle is assisted by skill and psychology. It is a risk/reward equation after all – if you go all out all the time you’re just going to pick up fouls. You have to know when to go all out, and when to hold back. Many people hated him, but no one could deny the Pure Hustle of Dennis Rodman. Rodman has 4329 career Offensive Rebounds, 611 career Steals and 531 career Blocks. They aren’t the best numbers around, but when you input them with his 1481 career turnovers and 2843 career fouls he manages a Pure Hustle rating of 1.80. This may not look like much, but for a frame of reference, Paul Millsap (what most current Jazz fans think Pure Hustle is all about) has managed a career Pure Hustle value of 1.24. So if Paul Millsap is giving 110% out there, Dennis Rodman is giving 155% out there.

 3. Shooting Worth (SW): This is an easy one, because it already exists on many website by it’s other name “Points per Shot” (PPS). It’s just how many total points you get (including free throws) divided by the number of shots (FGA) you take. Sure, there’s some points that may be unrepresented by FGA (like technical fouls, or being in the bonus), but the fact that the player is involved in those free throws is a benefit that they get for being good shooters. The idea is that if you take a shot it’s worth two points, right? Well, that doesn’t always work out in the PROs, and the league average (or mean for all player data) is 1.22. [Yes, I looked at every shot in the L last year on ESPN.com] So, in effect, you have a positive Shooting Worth if you are better than average, and have a SW greater than 1.22 – of course, you can still be good at your job if you have a lower value; you’d just be below league average. That’s the crux of this statistic – it seems to display individuals who take good shots, and this stat can be used to better differentiate between guys who score a high ppg who take good shots, or the guys who shoot a lot in order to get good stats.

Example: Allen Iverson has been a phenomenal scorer in his career. He’s averaged over 30 ppg on four separate occasions, and even with his no-show last year his career average is still 27.1 ppg. That’s a really great average, but how does that really stack up against a guy who averages something similar, but shoots much better than 42.5 fg%? Well, when you input Iverson's 23983 total career points over his 19,590 total shots you see that his actual Shooting Worth is 1.22 – which is exactly average. He’s not a “better” scorer than some of his contemporaries, he’s just a volume scorer. Karl Malone only has a career scoring average that’s in the 25 points per game range – but unlike Ivey, Karl was much better than average when it came to the quality of his shots; Karl’s Shooting Worth was 1.41 (better than lots of other known scorers like Kobe, Jerry West and Glen Rice, to name a few). From this we can conclude that a shot by Allen Iverson was, in effect, worth less than a shot by Karl – Karl was taking better shots.

 4. Shot Frequency (SF): Some websites try to find out often a player shoots and they represent it by the number of shots / value of time (usually minutes). I don’t know what 0.282 shots looks like, so that representation means little to me. I would rather look at the same data in another way, namely, how many minutes of burn does a player need before he jacks up a shot. Some guys start shooting the ball as soon as they are on the court, while others spend a lot of time on the court – but don’t shoot the ball. In effect, this stat (Shot Frequency) will be able to identify if a certain player is gun shy to a fault (some would say that John Stockton was) or a pure, unashamed jacker of shots (too many to name). In this case, the lower the number means a higher frequency of shots . . . because the number represented is the time needed on the floor between shots. To find this out we divide the total minutes played by the number of Field Goals attempted (FGA).

Example: Let’s continue talking about Iverson here. Most of his life he’s been the first option on offense … a guy that the rest of the team made way for. As a result, he spent a lot of his career shooting the ball. How often does he shoot? Well, he’s played in 36719 minutes and taken 19690 total field goal attempts in that time. If you input the data it reveals that Allen Iverson, for his career, will shot the ball once every 1.865 minutes he’s on the floor. To be honest, this is the highest frequency I’ve seen in all my months ‘beta testing’ these statistics. 1.865 minutes is every 1:52 of actual game time. So that means if he plays 35 minutes in a game he’ll shoot the ball nearly 19 times. For a point of reference another Hall of Fame type “point guard” is John Stockton, who shot the ball once every 3.497 minutes (once ever 3:30 of game time). If given the same amount of time (35 minutes), Stockton would shoot the ball 10 times. (Really, 10 times, 10.008 is pretty darn accurate!) That’s almost half as many shots as Iverson . . . and effectively, half as frequent.

This statistic helps us understand which guys really shoot the ball the most, and most likely, are the primary offensive options for any given team. (Though, some anomalies exist, like Matt Harpring who shoots the ball very frequently for a guy with his skills – he shot the ball more often than some guys who started over him during his career)

Gestalt Offense (GO): This is the biggie. I’ve fretted over this for days and days and finally am prepared to release it upon an unwitting population. It’s not perfect, and it seems to only work best with larger sample sizes (a seasons’ worth of data, or a road trip, may look fine – any singular game can break it). It really favors guards and only really works best for players who played in a modern-ish era (one where turnovers, offensive rebounds and other similar statistics were actually recorded). The basis for this was to isolate how much pressure certain players could place on the defense. What a player does on offense (when it comes to stats) can be either one of five things: he can assist on a score, he can get to the foul line, he can take a shot, he can be called for a turn over, or he can grab and offensive rebound. There are no stats for setting solid screens, or anything like the ‘hockey assist’ right now with how the stats are kept. So the statistic is already limited, but I try to do the best with the data that I have. Essentially the GO Rating is the summation of a player’s modified assists, free throw opportunities, offensive rebounding ability, penchant for scoring against their turnovers, all over the number of games a player has played:

Of course, it’s a lot more complicated than that . . .

The first, and most straight forward, part of the equation is assists. This equation not only values assists higher than their normal value ( 2.23 > 1, after all), but it also serves to give a bonus to good passers, and penalize poor passers. (Good or poor depending on if they have a high Assist to Turnover Ratio) The first standard value here is 2.23. Where did this value come from? Well, it’s the true value of an assist when you balance it for the ratio of assisted 2PTFG vs. 3PTFG. (According to the stats on ESPN.com, where all the major stats came from, aside from archived player stats from Basketball-Reference.com) The second standard number is 1.48, this is the mean Assist to Turnover ratio for teams in the NBA. (Room for improvement exists here if I could actually find the mean Assist to Turnover ratio for the players) As it stands how good you are at passing (vs. turning it over) affects how many total points you get from this category. After all, Tim Hardaway may be able to get you 37 assists on a road trip, but those 37 assists would be better than 37 assists from Alonzo Mourning because Zo would pick up quite a few more turnovers along the way.

Free throws are simple enough to understand now that we’ve gone through assists. Here we don’t look at how many free throws an individual has made, as the point of the GO rating was to see the type of pressure that an offensive player puts on the defense. Instead the focus is to see how many free throw attempts the player gets. Of course the catch is that value for FGA is modified by how good a shooter you are compared to the league average (which is 77%). A guy like José Manuel Calderón may only go to the line half the time as someone like Shaq – but Shaq is below average and Jose above average to the point that the difference in points from this category are not as large as we would think. Again, like in assists, it’s a bonus to good shooters and penalty to those who are not so hot from the line. In effect, you want your best free throw shooters at the line, their FTA are then worth more than that of guys who do not go to the line with as much confidence as they do.

Rebounding is easy. I figured that in the grand scheme of things, an Offensive Rebound is worth 1.16 points. I based this on how a Turnover is 1.3 points (see below), how an assist is 2.23 points and how points are worth, well, points. This is a modifier. The second modifier is similar to previous categories. Before we looked at if the player was better than average at Assist to turnover ratio, and then how they fared in FT% against the mean. Here we see that 26.73% of the total rebounds in the NBA were offensive rebounds. If you are a better than average offensive rebounder then you get a bonus here, if you are worse, then you get a negative modifier (as seen as a number less than 1.0, but not a negative number, per se). This part of the equation really seems to get broken if used on Charles Barkley (who, if you look at just one game, would get some crazy number of points in this section because he had 11 offensive rebounds and 5 defensive ones). Thankfully this section self-neuters itself if you have zero offensive rebounds.

Man, where do I begin with this one? Well, we went over Shot Frequency already. We divide 33.6 (representing 33.6 minutes of action for an elite player) by the player’s own Shot Frequency. This tells us how many shots he will put up if given Starter type of minutes. The next step is adding 1 to the Effective Field Goal Percentage (eFG%). This is so that we get a positive value with the percentage when multiplied. Why use eFG% instead of just regular FG%? Well, eFG% adds into account three point shots, and the higher degree of difficulty of shooting from that distance. (For more info on eFG% click here) This step tries to even things out a bit. The third part is how the player’s Shot Worth (also described earlier) rates compared to the league average for Shot Worth (or PPS). If you are Malone-like, you get a nice bonus here, if you are Iverson-like, you don’t get a bonus, and if you are really poor, then you get a penalty. The last part is the total points scored by the individual, divided by 10. Ten was one of the first numbers I used that seemed to make things work out when I was fiddling around. I don’t know if this last section of the Shooting section is legit or not yet, I remember when I tried this out without the last part that individuals would be getting very little from this part of the equation. At some stage you have to factor in how many points a guys scores, even if you are looking are how well they shoot.

Uhhhh, so this is very easy to understand. I’m not going to mention anything more than that this value is subtracted from the rest of the section values in the numerator. Don’t forget to divide everything by the total number of games, ya here!

Man, I’m super duper tired, so I’m just going to go ahead and post this. Give me feedback, tell me I’m crazy and set me straight. I think we need mores stats, and unfortunately, the lack of defensive categories means I can’t make a Defensive GO rating type of stat. I’m open to changing my formulas and re-working things. If you want I can e-mail you the spread sheet that contains the Macro that calculates these new stats. (I got really sick and tired of calculating the GO Rating by hand with pen and paper.)

I will probably make another post on the Go Rating in the future, filled with examples of players, and how they rated. So far I’ve seen that eFG%, Total Points, Assist to turnover ratio and a few other factors really seem to hinder bigmen, while giving guards and other wing players a boost. For the record, Magic Johnson’s GO Rating is 102.241, and he is the gold standard . . . some guys score higher than he does, while others politely fall into place. (Jordan is at 120, Karl Malone at 83, and so forth.)

Who else is sick with the Great Hype surrounding Andrew “Bust”num?

If you’ve ever wandered onto an LA Lakers blog, message board, or listened to a nationally broadcasted game by Mike “Fellatio for the Lakers 24/7” Tirico then you’ll know, with complete certainty, that Andrew Bynum is one of the best centers in the league, and will without giving any prior notice, become the next best center in the league and join the pantheon of great bigmen. He will rightfully sit alongside Wilt, Russell and Kareem while using Ewing, Robinson and O’Neal as foot rests. The third footrest will be necessary because of how great and grand his male organ must be – as he has been photographed at the Playboy mansion (who cares) and is curiously linked to Rihanna right now. (who? exactly.)

As impressive as his potential appears, and as great as his off-court life may or may not be (I’d rather hang out at the Acharya mansion any day of the week) – I’m less than impressed with him as a player. I’m even less impressed when I actually look at his accomplishments as a player in the playoffs (aka. when it counts). Furthermore, I’m pretty much sick to death by the hype that he has received from casual fans, homer fans, and the media alike. Now, this isn’t meant to trash the hopes of the future of the Lakers at all – I strive to temper the expectations of him a little bit. For his sake, and ours.

My brother is the most rational Lakers fan I know, he is passionate, but not completely under the spell that countless others are on the internet. He’s more concerned with consistent play, rebounding and solid defense from all of the Lakers and does not have the time to worry about if Bynum is going to be the next Kareem – he’s worried about right now. If I was a Lakers fan I wouldn’t be worried about right now – you guys will trounce Denver on your way to the NBA Finals (where anything can happen). I would, on the other hand, be worried about the past – specifically Bynum’s past.

He’s 21 years old right now and was drafted as a 17 year old. What do we know about him that should really count? How about the fact that he had an injury ruined high school career (leg/knee injury), and in the NBA has had two more leg/knee injuries in his young career. He’s tall, but not nearly as super athletic and fit as freaks like Dwight Howard or Amare Stoudemire are – I don’t expect him to be physically made of the same stuff as those guys are. When you get over 7 feet tall, any injuries to your lower body seriously limit how reliable you can be, regardless of how much work one may put on their upper bodies. (You’re only as strong as your base is – look at Yao Ming, who has just a storied lower body injury history as Bynum, he misses lots of games every year, and is never 100% due to the strain his body puts on his lower body) Amare had two career ending (had this been the 80’s/90’s) knee injuries, but has come back due to a great work ethic. Bynum puts women on his shoulders during rehab. I wouldn’t be making a huge leap by suggesting that Bynum may have a career that features a number of injuries to his lower body, not unlike Yao Ming – as opposed to being virtual injury free like Dwight Howard. But I have no crystal ball, I’m just going on the fact that he’s a big guy with a history of lower body injuries who was injury prone as a teen and only looks to put an increasingly large strain on those same joints as his ages and increases mass.

That’s not very empirical though, it’s just an assumed health arc based on his body type, job, apparent work ethic, how healthy other big guys his size have been and medical history. What is empirical, on the other hand, is to dig deep and look at stats. I love stats. Stats are flawed, as I’ve explained on this blog before, but they still give a pretty good indication of on court production. (After all, that’s what counts, points, rebounds, blocks, assists, steals, turn overs and fouls, right?)

After this last game against the Houston Rockets the total number of playoff games that Bynum has participated in stands at 18. These 18 games have taken him from 2005-2006 till now to amass. In that time he has been brought along slowly – thanks to the fact that he doesn’t need to be useful when he’s so far down the pecking order behind at least 4 other guys. That said, his production does not appear to be indicative of him joining the pantheon of great bigmen any decade soon. I want to look at his stats in the playoffs and see the promise that appears to be there (and only appears in regular season games against bad teams sandwiched between injuries). As a point of reference I looked at Patrick Ewing’s first 19 games (why not 18? wanted to complete that one series to make it an even number of playoff off series for the two) in the playoffs. Ewing was a great center, but never will he be called the best of his generation, and thus, not up for entry into the pantheon of greatest bigmen ever (though the media has already reserved a spot there for Bynum).

Bynum’s first 18 Playoff games, and how they stack up:

Ewing creams Bynum statistically. And Ewing played in a time where big guys weren’t bailed out with foul shots, and played against much better competition. Bynum played against the Phoenix Suns, twice anchored in the paint by Frenchman Boris Diaw; the injury depleted Utah Jazz that was forced to start Jarron Collins; and the Houston Rockets, who during the course of the series, lost Yao Ming to injury a little more than 2 games in – and had to turn to a rotation of Chuck Hayes, Carl Landry and Luis Scola to battle LA’s 7 footers. Bynum gets killed – just look at the stats.

Alas, he is immune to any criticism for a great rebuttal exists: Ewing had much more experience from being a guy who actually went to college, won a National Title; and also played in the NBA for a few seasons before making the playoffs. All this is true, but nothing prevented Bynum from going to college himself – if he was really interested in experience. That said, I also took a chance to look at another young bigman, and saw how he faced the NBA pressure. David Robinson did manage to make the playoffs as a rookie (he led his team there, unlike Bynum who did his best to stay out of Kobe’s way). David Robinson is far from my favorite player in the world – but he also creams Bynum’s numbers when you take out experience and look just at Bynum’s FIRST FOUR SEASONS against David’s ROOKIE season.

Let’s not forget that David had to go to war against Joe Barry Carroll and the plethora of tough guys in the paint that Portland sported back when David was a rookie. Bynum, with 4 years of experience in the NBA, has yet to face anything like that in the NBA playoffs – and his numbers are completely pathetic.

Ewing: 22.1 ppg, 10.9 rpg, 2.37 bpg

Robinson: 24.4 ppg, 12.00 rpg, 4.00 bpg

Bynum: 4.83 ppg, 3.78 rpg, 0.67 bpg

Obviously the data is heavily skewed against poor, young Bynum. His first few playoff sorties were short and he was inexperienced. Obviously the stats are going to go against him when you include some of his early games. The Bynum of today is a beast though! Look at Bynum’s numbers from just his 4th season in the playoffs against other greats and you’ll see! You’ll all see!

Okay, let’s do that then.

Bynum’s Playoff stats from his 4th season, and how those stats stack up:

Bynum’s numbers improve very slightly, he ups his ppg from 4.83 to 5.58, his free throw percentage from 62.96% to 76.47% and he swats almost 0.2 more blocks per game. Still not impressed. He’s a far cry from, let’s just randomly say, Hakeem Olajuwon. In the Dream’s 4th NBA season he happened to tear the NBA playoff’s a new one with his scoring -- 37.5 ppg (57.14 fg%, 88.37 ft%); rebounding – 16.75 rpg; and all around game – 2.75 bpg, 1.75 apg, 2.25 spg.

Not only did Hakeem obliterate Bynum’s pitiful offensive output by a magnitude nearing 7x, but absolutely owned him all over the boxscore. He also did it against much tougher competition as well.

Heck, Bynum is so far from being impressive that Greg Ostertag’s fourth year playoff stats could (and do) give Bynum’s fourth year playoff stats a run for their money. It’s horrible to say, but really Lakers fans (and media, or is that redundant?) – take a look and weep.

Bynum is a much better offensive player than Ostertag (is this even saying anything?), but Ostertag owns Bynum when it comes to rebounds and blocks. Greg even managed to out-assist Bynum and made less mistakes (as seen in less turn overs and fouls per game).

What’s worse, the fact that Bynum just got his lunch handed to him by Ostertag; or the fact that Ostertag was doing this against super duper vets and talented players like Vlade, Arvydas, Dale Davis and Rasheed (when Ostertag was a 4th year player) – and looking better than media adored Bynum going up against Chuck Hayes and the guy who was behind Ostertag on the depth chart?

Furthermore, Bynum’s had 5 scoreless games in the playoffs, out of 18. And he’s scored less than 5 points 11 times out of 18. Ouch.

Take a look at Hakeem’s 37.5 ppg average again. Ouch.

Of course, there HAS to be a rebuttal for this . . . no way can Bynum been so far behind Hakeem at the same stage of NBA experience, and yet so close to NBA laughingstock Greg Ostertag . . . right?  . . . .right? Don’t worry Lakers fans, of course there is . . . forget about NBA experience, that’s a flawed concept. Let’s not forget that Hakeem and Greg both played college ball (like Ewing and Robinson did) . . . Bynum didn’t play college. Look at how young he is! He’s only 21! Surely when you take that into account it makes up for 32 ppg (in the case of Hakeem), or nearly a block and a half (in the case of Ostertag)!!!

Okay, let’s take at a look at that. Try me.

Bynum’s Playoff stats as a 21 year old, and how those stats stack up against another 21 year old:

Bynum is a very brittle 21 year old who doesn’t have to do anything, and his team makes it to the NBA Finals. I’m not lying, the Lakers did that last season. That said, Bynum is a force of nature, and the future of the center position in the NBA. His 21 year old production is unrivaled. Right? Wrong. Take a look at this guy, and what he did in the playoffs at the tender age of 21 (his 2nd season in the L, not his 4th like Bynum). I just have one hyphenated word to describe this: Shaq-Attaq.

A lot of the same Lakers fans who champion Bynum marginalize how great Shaq was. I can clearly see why Kobe went out of his way to suggest that Bynum needed to be traded – because Kobe knew how good Shaq was. The difference between the two is quite telling when you look at these two centers at the age of 21, Bynum in his 4th season and Shaq in his 2nd.

The difference between the two was almost 15 points, 10 rebounds and over 2 blocks and almost 2 assists . . . in favor of the 2nd year player.

That’s a huge difference.

The difference between being called one of the best bigmen of all time, and being called a bust.

Bynum was a lotto pick man, and aside from his inspired dirty play in injuring two guys this season, and being afraid of Fesenko in the paint, he’s done nothing to earn the high praise that’s heaped on him. And he’s done nothing to make me feel like giving him any props.

His current playoff run isn’t over yet, and he’s got one, most likely two more playoff series to make his 2008-2009 playoffs slightly more memorable than his complete no-show in the 2007-2008 playoffs.

I’m taking it easy on Bynum here by comparing him to guys that he may yet one-day reach . . . even if it doesn’t seem like it. I could really try to down him if I wanted by comparing him to his contemporaries who are out-playing him right now. For example take Dwight Howard -- in his first 14 playoff games: 17.86 ppg (57.23 fg%, 51.72 ft%), 15.5 rpg, 2.71 bpg, 1.14 apg, 0.714 spg . . . those numbers are way better than Bynum’s. Also better are Dwight’s numbers as a 21 year old and Dwight’s numbers in his 4th NBA season.

If I really wanted to be a dick I’d mention that Dwight also has 3 less leg injuries. I’m not a dick though, so I’m not going to mention that.

 

 

What did we learn?

What did we learn? Well, for starters we learned that Andrew Bynum’s playoff performances leave much to be desired. His first 18 games in the playoffs pales in comparison to Ewing’s numbers over the same situations – and Ewing played against much better defensive clubs like Michael’s Bulls and the Bad Boy Pistons. We learned that David Robinson’s rookie season playoff numbers invalidates the argument that Bynum’s rookie numbers shouldn’t count. We also learned that Hakeem’s numbers as a fourth year player completely eclipse Bynum’s as a 4th year player. I didn’t even have to look up 2nd tier NBA centers like Rik Smits at all after I found out that at the same level of NBA experience that Greg Ostertag’s playoff performance was a wash with that of Bynum’s. Lastly, we learned that Bynum can’t even hide behind his age as an excuse for how poor his performances have been – as Shaq as a 21 year old eats Bynum up. Ultimately, we learned that it’s a bit too premature to call Bynum anything other than a bust at this stage. He’s much closer to Ostertag, albeit one who rebounds and blocks less, and fouls and turns the ball over more, than he is to being one of the greatest bigmen of all time – let alone in his own generation.

After all, Dwight’s numbers at each break down (first x number of games, 4th NBA season, and at age 21) are vastly superior to Bynum’s. Oh yeah, also Bynum has a history of injury problems to the same parts of his body and young guys who sustain so many injuries in short succession tend to have injury plagued careers. Yeah, I wasn’t supposed to mention that again . . . I guess I am a dick after all.

Bynum doesn’t deserve his hype until he does something. Something other than sucking when it counts, that is.

If you liked the stat breakdown, and would like a full version at full resolution, click on the image below. I dunno, maybe you are just into making Bynum look silly . . . or want a stat heavy window’s desktop wallpaper . . . or both? Go nuts!

Contract years, Developing Talent & Front Office Subterfuge

The work of a General Manager is easy to criticize, yet hard to fully quantify. Team owners are like dragons sleeping on their hoard of gold coins and other priceless treasures. Coaches want to build winning resumes. Players want to get paid. The GM has to be the go-between that gets all these parties (with differing motivations) on the same page. The GM has to get a coach the players he needs to win. The players want the promises they need before signing on the dotted line (salary, role, playing time, etc). And for the team owner, well, the GM has to placate this obstacle on a near daily basis and convince the owners not to devourer the GM on sight -- while suggesting that parting with part of their hoard (on the 1st and 15th of each month) is the smart thing to do.

At times the NBA can be distilled to purer components, of winning and losing, and of the honesty of the game. Yet, at other times the NBA can expand into a complex juggling act more akin to micromanagement in a strategy game, or a RTS click-fest. For players, the game is the game. It's simple in that way, and relies on skill, speed and quick reflexes -- a Video Game analogy would be the first person shooter. For coaches, it's series of complex decisions, not unlike the original turn based strategy game called "Chess". (you may have heard of it) The GM, though, has to delve into the previously mentioned RTS click-fest:

But instead, imagine dealing with salaries, egos, scouts, coaches, players and injuries . . . also less cannons, probably . . .

*Ahem* Back to the point . . . a GM's job is rarely done perfectly because of how difficult it tends to be. Some GM's are great talent evaluators (for example, there's Isiah Thomas, just look at the player's he has drafted in his career, most of them have been All-Stars or award winners in some regard: Vince Carter, Tracy McGrady, Marcus Camby, Damon Stoudamire, David Lee, and so on) but poor on other sides of their job description. Other GM's have good connections with other teams, and always seem to do business with them (look at Kevin O'Connor and all the deals he has made with Philly over the years). Some GM's are really good with managing money, while others are known for turning things around in short order. At the end of the day, though, the GM is a salesman. He is essentially selling his services to a consumer -- in this case the team owner. Part of sales is to buy low and sell high. Another part of sales is to be consciously deceptive in just what your wares are. That last part does not really apply fully to the GM - Team Owner relationship, but rather to the GM to GM relationship. Sometimes you get a lemon, but you have to pass it off as a safe family sedan. Other times you (as the GM) are working not against the team owner, the other GM's, but the actual assets -- the players and their agents.

You want to keep a good player on your team for the least amount of money it's going to take to keep him there. All Team Owners expect the GM to be able to do such a thing. This part of the job ties in directly with the buy low/sell high and deceptive doctrines. If the first step is acquiring a player (via a Trade, Free Agency or the Draft), then the next step is evaluating that player (though, we hope that some evaluations have taken place before the player is traded for/signed/drafted). The next logical step would be to give playing time to that player and develop him. The last step? Making a decision on that guy -- sign him again when his contract expires, trade him, or let him walk. Parts of the last step depend greatly on each of the previous steps.

• For example, say the team acquires player A. They evaluate him, see some things they like, some things he needs to improve on, and play him accordingly. He either gets better or worse. If he does well, he becomes more valuable to the team -- and more valuable as a player. His asking price may go up, and making the last step (in this case: deciding to keep him) harder to do. An example of this Jazz fans may be familiar with would be All-Star Mo Williams.
• Player B, on the other hand, does not appear to have much upside, does not make the most of his chances on the court, and is not in the future plans of the team. They can get rid of him in a variety of ways, the team's disinterest in retaining him opens up options for his removal. An example of this Jazz fans may be familiar with would be Kris Humphries.

It's not always this simple, though.

• What about Player C . . . the team that drafts him knows him best, and knows that there is hidden potential deep inside. If they go about normally giving him playing time, allow him to develop openly (instead of only during closed practices and workouts with the team), then other GM's may wish to pry him away. Even if the original team wishes to keep him, retaining him may become very difficult as the exposure led to quicker development, which led to a greater player value. This would be repeating the same mistake with Player A all over again. What if, instead, the team decides to develop him secretly, give him less exposure, drive his asking price down, remove interest other GMs would have in him, and basically, keep him on the "down low".

This is pretty much the only way to retain those people that you think *can* blow up (in a good way), without having to give them a lot of money to make them stay. Deron Williams deserves the contract he got. It's an expensive contract though. Some teams are forced to over-pay to retain their talent (don't need to look farther than a young, uninjured Andrei Kirilenko half a decade ago). In general, you want to avoid doing that. If anything, I think we can clearly place the curious case of C.J. Miles as an example of a Player C scenario.

At the end of C.J.'s first season he was getting more playing time, and in the last game of the season he played really well. How well? 23 points (8/13 fg, 2/5 3pt, 5/8 ft), 6 rebounds, 4 assists, 2 blocks, 1 steal -- as a rookie with extend playing time playing against a tough Western Conference team. Every off-season since then there have been fishy things going on. He was a consistent no-show in future summer leagues, but instead opted to work on his game by himself. During times of injury he would be pressed into the starting line-up, only to return to the end of the bench only a few days later. C.J. should have played more than he did in when he was on his rookie contract. The clock struck 12 on C.J.'s contract though, and the Jazz simply put themselves in a situation to match whatever contract someone threw his way by virtue of him being a restricted free agent. No one really bit, not knowing what they would be getting . . . until Oklahoma City offered him a 4 year $15 million dollar contract. We all know how that story ended, as the Jazz eventually matched. Was $3.75 million per season too much for C.J. Miles? Perhaps . . . but at the same time, it's a lot less than it could have been had C.J. been playing like he is now at this time last season. (or perhaps, getting the playing time that he is getting now at this time last season) Back then I thought the Jazz were (in chronological order) a) not developing C.J. enough, b) using him only for spot duty, c) giving his playing time to guys who did not deserve it.

This season Ceejay has been everything from a solid deep threat, a versatile 2nd option on offense, to invisible . . . sometimes all in the same week. This is his 4th season in the league, and his first where he has averaged over 11.5 mpg. I'm sure he would be better, more seasoned player than he currently is if he was playing 20 mpg every season after his rookie campaign. I'm also pretty sure that he wouldn't be on the Jazz then. In effect, one could directly point to a systematic way in which the Jazz brass (Sloan and O'Connor mostly) lowered interest in a prospect, sequestered him from exposure (he only got one short stint in the NBA DL), yet did not develop him for fear of losing him. At the end of the day the Jazz have C.J., but not the C.J. he could be right now, and C.J. is not earning as much as he perhaps thought he would be after his rookie contract expired.

The Jazz financial situation is horrible right now. If it does not improve shortly than there may be a few more Player A type situations in the future with key contributors Paul Millsap and Ronnie Brewer. The Jazz would love to keep them for reasonable contracts, though their development (and production) have elicited quite a bit of exposure. Good for their bank accounts, perhaps not so great for the Jazz.

That's where the micromanagement comes back into play. You want your players to be good, productive and develop . . . but you do not want to lose them to other teams after you put in all the hard work to make them useful. Gilbert Arenas comes to mind, he was drafted, developed, and then left to get paid in free agency. Right now the Jazz are playing the "front office subterfuge game" with some other young players that could possibly be helping the Jazz right now.

Morris Almond: He is a scorer's scorer, who despite having limited quickness and has played defense only once in his life, could be doing a whole lot more for this Jazz team. He's looked horrible in his rookie season with the Jazz where he never got to be involved in the plays that the regular rotation run that get swingmen easy buckets. He didn't play a minute with Deron Williams last year, and was relegated to garbage time spot up shooting from the corner. Reason for not getting playing time: He's behind a few key guys on the depth chart and doesn't rebound or defend as well as others. For some reason this has prevented him from playing one single second in the NBA-DL this season. Something fishy: Why hasn't he played in the D-League at all this season then, if there's no space for him on our current roster? Do the Jazz know that he's a raw gem that only seems to look better when he gets to play?  Utah is healthy now, so there's no real risk to put him in the game at all . . . maybe practice with the Jazz is better than games with the Flash? Or maybe they don't want him to get too much exposure right now? Utah has opted not to extend his contract, so seemingly he is out . . . but maybe they are trying to keep his going rate low so that they *can* still have a shot at retaining him for a while. After all, they scouted him, interviewed him, drafted him, are developing him . . . Harpring's contract expires next year, and the Jazz will need a wing player who can come off that Harpring curl and hit the mid-range jumper. Financial situation aside, that sounds like something the Jazz have in their laps right now with Almond. Alas, this is exactly not the contract type of year a young player wants to have (being buried on the bench). Co-incidentally, this is exactly the type of contract year the Jazz would want him to have . . . after all, they did the same thing with Ceejay, they know what they are doing.

Kyrylo Fesenko: Very large man (7'1, 300+ lbs.) with the same wingspan and standing reach as Greg Oden -- yet uninjured and a capable passer and interior defender who has, due to injuries, been pressed into defending the likes of Yao Ming to Andrew Bynum . . . and done so well. Very likely that he is more talented than the guy ahead of him on the depth chart (Jarron Collins), but lacks experience, familiarity with the system and seasoning. Reason for not getting playing time: Work ethic and personality appear to anchor this man to the bench, though at some level talent and ability should trump that. Something fishy: As a rookie, this wet behind the ears, 2nd round draft pick center joined the Jazz and played in 70 games, and played over 20 mpg. This player joined a playoff team that was contending for a championship. This player had no experience with the Jazz system prior (as a rookie) and ended up getting playing time over a limited, soft center who had much more experience in the system. This young player was Jarron Collins. What, did you think I was talking about Fesenko? Heck no, Fesenko has played only 200 minutes with the Jazz in his 2 year career, let alone played in 70 (@ 20 per) as a rookie. Why is there such a disparity between Collins' and Fesenko's early careers? I don't know, but it seems kind of fishy to me. Even more fishy is that Fes only had one stint in the NBA-DL this season (8 games), promptly did exactly what we'd want him to do (be a defensive presence who rebounded, blocked and changed shots, shot a high percentage and eventually was averaging a double double) . . . and was called back and never played again. Ever. Hmmmm . . . he improves, shows that he's good at what he does . . . and can be a free agent this season . . . 'need to reel that big boy in, and hide him somewhere!' (which was the original plan with drafting a little known, poorly scouted player from a minor European league in the first place) More so than Almond, I think that Fesenko has a future with the Jazz, or at the very least, in the NBA somewhere as teams always want size, and if the guy is talented, he's going to get a contract somewhere. If you gave him the playing time, I'm pretty sure that he'd be able to get Rookie Millsap type of numbers for sure.

Paul Millsap: Speaking of the 'Sap, he got some great exposure this season. He produced as a starter due to injuries to Carlos Boozer. He's a free agent, and he's going to get paid this off-season. No doubt about it. Interestingly enough, at the first whiff of a hobbled, rusty Carlos Boozer the Jazz sent 'Sap back to the bench and as his fantasy owners know firsthand, 'Sap just hasn't been the same since. Reason for being sent to the bench: Boozer was the starter before he got injured, the Jazz/Sloan doctrine on this is that you cannot lose your starting job due to injury. Something fishy: No one said anything about a starting job, but just let Paul start the first 4-5 games after Boozer comes back and then let Boozer slowly work his way back into playing shape, and then give Boozer the starting spot. A lot of teams do this, they bring a starter back from injury on the bench just to test things out a bit. Out of all of my conspiracies, this is among the weakest -- though I don't see why the Jazz didn't keep starting Millsap for 4 games while Boozer (who was playing limited minutes) worked his way back into starting shape. For one thing, this almost looks like a directed attempt to reduce Millsap's exposure (for the open market). It's probably not, but it just looks fishy -- during a contract year, no less.

Kosta Koufos: Let's just say that if this 19 year old was playing Brook Lopez type of minutes on a bad team we'd see Brook Lopez-ish production out of Kosta. Yet, a guy who is clearly more talented than Collins, and is a very hard worker (much more than Fesenko has shown), is completely lost on this team. Kosta isn't on the active roster right now, isn't playing in the development league, and isn't developing. Reason for not getting playing time: Apparently he doesn't know the plays. Sure, he's a smart shot blocking 7 footer who has a nice offensive game AND is a very hard worker who hustles . . . but he's not going to get to play because by playing him he would then be in a position to actually learn the plays, and then we would have even less of an excuse for why he isn't playing. He's almost a gestalt character that takes the size (mostly) and shot blocking of Fess, with the hustle and work ethic of Collins . . . and gets none of the playing time that he should. Something fishy: There is no good reason not to play this guy, develop him with real NBA minutes, or even send him to the NBA D-League for some in game action. He hasn't seen the developmental league at all in his career, instead getting better by wearing suits next to Carlos Boozer for 50+ games. That's another thing, he got some very minor playing time just because of injuries . . . this season was a prime season to be forced into playing and developing younger talent. Sloan had to work many games without being able to call on veteran bigmen . . . but still he elected to instead play Matt Harpring at power forward. Huh?

It's not that difficult to imagine that the Jazz are hurting their futures by risking not getting these guys playing time because they do not want to lose them to other teams . . . but they also get nothing out of these guys. Other teams play younger players during the regular season so that they may become contributors to that team . . . and even help them in the playoffs. Heck, our team did this with Paul Millsap as a rookie, or Shandon Anderson (more on him later), or Bryon Russell and a host of others. There's no doubt in my mind that if Fess of Kosta were getting 12-15 mpg this season that one of them would be able to contribute in the playoffs for us. Instead the development time has become much longer for a bunch of guys who could be helping us now. Also, it's not that difficult to imagine that the Jazz are hurting the values of their players by flat out burying them during contract years. No playing time = no exposure and no stats = bargain prices. They did this with C.J., and if they had a time machine, would probably like to do so with others as well.

The way that the Jazz develop talent seems to be highly unequal. Some young guys get regular burn, while others don't. This time is directly proportional towards development. I think that Jazz Brass feel the financial side to all of this needs to take precedence over the immediate development and returns from the players on the roster. The Jazz gave good minutes to a solid player (Shandon Anderson) as a rookie, and eventually left the team, the Jazz get nothing in the long term for it. The Jazz gave good minutes to a very talented player (Andrei Kirilenko), and end up having to really over-pay to keep him on the team. The Jazz don't want to get into anything like that again, and now underplay most guys during the span of their rookie contracts, so they they do not have to over-pay.

C.J., only after the Jazz matched an offer he got from another team, is finally getting playing time -- but as a 4th year guard with the potential that he had when he was drafted, he is behind where he should be. They seem to be guilty of doing that with Almond and Fesenko by not playing them in the NBA, nor allowing them to rack up stats in the D-League . . . which would have been a great way to audition for other teams during contract years -- or you know, actually get better and be able to help OUR team.

Some Jazz apologists feel like the practices the Jazz have are of greater value to a younger player than actually playing in the development league, or even playing in the NBA on poorer quality teams. I think that this is a very haughty thing to say . . . especially with how closely the Jazz *can* keep an eye on things with their development team being only a few miles away and the coach of that team is related to Jerry Sloan -- it almost seems like a no-brainer to send the kids down at least once each when none of them are even on the active roster with the Jazz. They threw C.J. a bone once by doing that, by giving him a chance to play, and that improved his morale. Why not do the same for a younger player this season? Sloan even goes out to harp on how great the D-League is, and how he wishes they had that when he first came into the league. If it's so great, why not use it, now that the rest of the guys are healthy?

As for how great the Jazz practices are . . . they rarely get a chance to practice on the road (they only practice on days off, and now at the end of the season, with the playoffs coming up, there may be less than the regular number of practices on off-days), so the younglings are getting even less time to improve than normal. This clearly is the case where the GM, at the behest of saving the team owner money, works with the coaches to screw the players out of money / job satisfaction. Or maybe that's by design, especially in their contract years?

Dollar$ and Cent$: Just say 'No' to the 2009 NBA Draft

First of all, if you are a Pete Maravich/Ricky Rubio fan, then you don't need to worry about this draft. Secondly, if you are the Utah Jazz, you don't want nothing to do with this one either, but for an entirely different reason: money. Money is a huge big deal in the NBA -- and in more than that art imitates life type of way. People want to get paid. (Even if they don't deserve it) Utah -- when healthy -- is a pretty nice team. In order to keep this team together the Jazz Brass (particularly Jazz GM Kevin O'Connor) is going to have to get new team owner Greg Miller to open the, how do you say, "cheque book". The salary situation is bananas. (but not in the "it changes every day" type of way) Just take a look for yourself. This off season the Jazz may have to ink new deals for Carlos Boozer, Mehmet Okur, Paul Millsap, Jarron Collins and Kyrylo Fesenko -- essentially all the bigmen on the roster except for Andrei Kirilenko and current rookie Kosta Koufos.

Boozer	Okur	Millsap	Fesenko	Collins
$12.7 mill next year, looking for more according to interview he gave weeks ago to ESPN	$9 mill next year, looking for more (according to Turkish media)	Making less than $800k, Restricted Free Agent will be offered 10x that on the market at least	Team option for less than $900k	Somehow making $2 mill this year

That's not all the free agents though, as the Jazz will need to figure out what they are doing with their point guard situation (both back-ups, Brevin Knight and Ronnie Price, have expiring contracts) and that Morris Almond guy . . . well, it's a damn shame what happened to that guy. The year after that (i.e. the Off-Season of 2010) there needs to be some money for Ronnie Brewer (who's qualifying offer is going to be at a hair under $4 million per season), Matt Harpring (who, for whatever reason, we are incapable of getting rid of) and anyone else who didn't get taken care of this off-season.

The 'best' thing is to find out which guys we really want, and develop a strategy to keep them. Out of all of those names the most important free agents (right now) are Boozer, Okur, Millsap, Brewer and Knight. Championship teams do not depend on the services of guys like Jarron Collins, or Ronnie Price. Brewer does not need a new deal until next season. Mehmet Okur has not made any waves about opting out, unlike Boozer, so both of them 'could' still be on the books for the next year. (At the rate of $9 million and $12.7 million respectively) If all three are on the books then we only really need to worry about Knight and Millsap. The back-up PG situation can be handled with part of the exception. (I could be wrong, as I'm not a cap-ologist) The rest of the money can be used on Millsap. (What money? Where is this money coming from? The Jazz are already over the cap . . . there IS no more money!) The closer to reality we get (and hence, the closer to actually dealing with the cap) the closer we get to recognizing that this situation sucks.

There just isn't enough money to go around. If you bare bones it, have Boozer opt out (and not be resigned by the Jazz), let Collins and Price walk, jettison Fesenko with the team option on his contract -- then you'll have enough money to go around for Millsap, Okur, Brewer and Knight over the next two season . . . but only have 9 players on the roster. You're not allowed to have only 9 players on your roster. The Jazz will have to pick up a few low cost scrubs in order to fill out the roster -- not a bad move, but still, there's no guarantee that Boozer will opt out now (even though he said that he would), and secondly, the Jazz may not (for whatever reason) get rid of Collins, Price *or* Fesenko. Under Larry H. Miller, R.I.P., the Jazz were a small town family more than they were a business. Guys like Harpring and Collins had expiring contracts a few seasons ago, and they were given (back then) seriously over priced golden handshake deals. It should have ended there, but I don't know if it really will. So, okay, let's scratch that idea of the Jazz actually going to 'not' sign company men. I really do not have a great solution to the Jazz financial situation, but, I do know where some money can be saved: the 2009 NBA Draft.

Right now the Jazz are not going to go over the hump with a late 1st round pick and a late 2nd round pick. Especially not from this upcoming draft. The last thing the Jazz need is to use money on a guaranteed contract that'll eat up some of the money that would be better served being spent on the likes of Millsap or Brevin Knight. Luckily, the Jazz are in just the position to get rid of their draft picks this year. We owe Philly a 1st round pick (from the Korver trade), and Philly owes Minnesota a 1st round pick (Rodney Carney trade). If the Jazz pick lower than 22nd in this year, Minnesota will get our pick. That helps out everyone involved, especially the Jazz. The hard part, though, is getting a good enough record to finish the season with so that we are picking at 22 or lower. The Jazz will need to finish with one of the top 9 records in the league when all is said and done. Where are we today? Sitting at #10, percentage points behind New Orleans. If Utah can leapfrog New Orleans, Portland and Houston we'll be in the clear -- while keeping Dallas, Atlanta and Phoenix behind us in the standings. Sounds very plausible, and while I'd love to give up on a very late 1st round draft pick and save money, I don't know how possible this is going to end up being. The longer we hold onto the pick that we owe Philly -- that they'll give to Minnesota -- the better the pick can possibly get (going upwards from #22 to getting near the lotto if we hold it till 2013). Better to get rid of it sooner, rather than later.

The 2nd round pick is an entirely different animal, as the Jazz may be willing to keep it in plans of a draft and stash with another International (most likely European) player. This way the money for that guy is not on the books, but we still keep the rights to him. We're currently doing this with International Men of Mystery Tadija Dragicevic and Ante Tomic. As far as I am concerned, we have enough European bigmen to last a few seasons. I don't think that European swingmen are the answer to our problems. Nor do I think that our future back-up PG is going to be a European point guard. Sure, we could draft and stash *any* International player, but I don't know how great our scouting of South America is. (If we're not getting a Euro, he'll be from the Americas somewhere -- don't see us drafting an Asian or African player -- I really don't think we're actively scouting those parts of the world) The answer here, again, appears to be giving our pick to Philly, as we still owe them future considerations in the 2nd round because of the Fesenko-Hill trade a few years back.

We skip the draft this season, focus on the players we have, and save some money right now. I think that's not a bad idea at all. Plus, then the next year's draft (2010), we'll have plenty of picks that we can use as assets for trades, or well, you know, draft picks. We may have a few holes to fill two off-seasons from now. We'll have two 1st round picks (our own, hopefully a low pick; and the Knicks unprotected, possibly lotto, pick). I'm sure both of those picks could be traded to a bad team if we wanted to move up in the draft . . . I dunno . . . if we actually find someone that we'd like to add to the team.

In completely unrelated news, doesn't this kid look like Fesenko's younger brother? This guy is Donatas Motiejunas, a Lithuanian center that projects to be a lotto pick in the 1st round of the 2010 NBA Draft. I don't know much about the kid, but I do know that unless he's the reincarnation of Wilt, I don't want the Jazz to ever get close to drafting this guy. We have enough young center prospects that we're not developing already.