These aren’t John Hollinger’s dad’s statistics

Okay, I love direct observational research as much as the other guy, but as someone firmly rooted in the sciences (aka. wasting my life in college and beyond), I love quantifiable results. As a result, I find that statistics are vital towards observing, categorizing and understanding the environment that we inhabit (and share with other organisms). Stats are awesome, and I love them (I got 98% in stats in university) . Though, I know that stats can be manipulated and abused – furthermore, statistics do not fully explain the entire situation, nor do sufficient statistics exist that can approach a full knowledge of a hybrid (not just numerical) system.

We can attempt to use statistics to better understand basketball – and as a fan, and non-paid analyst, I’m not alone in this point of view (just check out the Wages of Wins sometime). That said, the statistics that we currently have in basketball are not complete. No current stats exist to fully describe all possible positive actions on the court (e.g. there’s no stat for a defender breaking / slipping a screen and staying on his man, despite the set play run by the offense). Also, some stats that would be useful are just not recorded in the NBA (e.g. in the Adriatic league their stats also include things like how many times a player has their shot blocked, or how many times a player draws a foul – don’t you want to know how many times Dirk gets stuffed, or how many fouls Shaq drew per game during his peak?).

Right now there aren’t enough stats to fully map out good play, and some of the stats that we do have appear to mean more than they actually do! A steal means that a defender has disrupted the offense to the point that a turnover has occurred – many guards and swingmen get steals. The bigman analog has always been blocks, but the most important part of the steal (aka, the change of actual possession of the ball) is lost in a block. Often a blocked shot prevents a made basket, but does not always give possession back to the defending side. In effect, a blocked shot that still gives the ball back to the offense is no better than a defender causing a deflection of a pass where the ball goes out of bounds – and the offensive team retains possession.

Deflections are the most important stat that continues to not be officially counted by the NBA; on one hand it would be difficult to adjudicate (when is it a block? when is it a deflection?), but on the other hand, deflections often lead to other stats. The guy who picks up a ball that’s deflected out of the hand of the ball carrier is rewarded with a steal – but the guy who got the ball out of the ball carrier’s hand (the deflector) doesn’t get credited for causing the play. I think that’s kind of unfair.

In fact the guy who defends well frequently gets jobbed out of a good stat. For years I’ve seen a solid defensive play in the paint by a center (straight up single coverage that results in his man taking a shot – and missing) be recorded as a GREAT defensive board by the power forward (who wasn’t defending anyone, he just happened to get the rebound off of someone else's good defense). I’ve seen this happen on all levels of play. If anything, it prove the limitations of stats, and the limitations of the stats to accurately reward defense.

It’s no secret that defense is way harder to grade by using stats alone. Firstly, there are not enough defensive stats (like the guy who can navigate through a number screens and gets back in time to contest/change a shot gets the same amount of stats as another play who doesn’t even go through the screens and lets his man take an open jumper), and secondly, the stats that do exist do not always mean great defense. A very quick guy like Allen Iverson spent years on the court playing in the passing lanes. This is him gambling on defense to get steals. It’s exciting when a guy does get those break away steals in the game – but it’s not sound, fundamental man defense. Really, this play is sorely discouraged in the case where there isn’t a big shot blocker in the paint to clean up any mess that an unguarded PG getting into the paint can cause.

I know – I’ve seen John Stockton make these same type of ‘Defensive Back’ style steals because he had big Mark Eaton (two time defensive player of the year – once had close to 500 blocks in a season) watching his back. Iverson had the same with Theo Ratliff and Dikembe Mutombo. Chris Paul is another player who benefits from being backed up by shot blocking force of nature Tyson Chandler. If guys like Stockton, Iverson and Paul had Mehmet Okur and Jarron Collins laying down the law in the paint behind them you can be sure that the head coach would have told them to defend their man more, and gamble on defense less.

Over the years I’ve been lucky enough to coach some basketball on the youth developmental level. We tried to go past the lack of collected stats on defense in order to quantify good play on both sides of the ball. An attempt was made to count the number of times the player defending a shooter resulted in that shooter missing. Other times we tried to record good traps on the ball carrier, or how many times the defender harassed the ball handler into turning the ball over. These types of things can be recorded but by far the best defense I’ve ever seen on any level is that where the man being defended does not ever get the ball, entry passes are denied, position is denied, and when he does get the ball – he’s in such a disadvantageous point that he cannot positively help his team when he has the ball. You know what kind of stats that guy gets – for playing the best defense? He gets nothing for it. There is no reward for him that shows up on the boxcore – and this is a failure in terms of statistics being used to categorize and enumerate good play in a game. But if he manages to tip an errantly passed ball that he forces the guy he’s defending into attempting(because he can’t shoot it where he is), the team mate who picks up the ball gets credited for a steal.

Oh yeah, that’s basically it for defense in the NBA, I talked about the fallacy that defensive boards is akin to good defense, I talked about how blocks may stop a shot, but do not give you possession of the ball all that time, and I talked about how steals can be indicative of poor defense, not good defense. (Of course, exceptions to these rules always exist – it is good defense to control a tough defensive rebound that’s contested, or to block a shot to a team mate, or to single handedly strip a guy that  you are defending. But let’s not forget that these instances of good defense are counted just as much as the same stats that are products of situational defense. A ball that rolls do you on defense counts just like a ball that you fought for.)

The long and short of it is that we need more stats – especially on defense. If you’ve read this far down then you are awesome . . . because I’ve tried to make some ‘new’ stats. Some people are good enough for simple points, rebounds, assists, steals and blocks. That’s fine for a casual fantasy basketball league . . . but not good enough if you really watch the game like your life depends on it. I wish there were more stats, and more ways to reward good play – but right now the NBA does not appear to give us things like that (instead the +/- stat is thrown to us, like it means anything). Anyway, I’ve tried to make some new stats and here are five calculations that you can even do at home (studio audience of old ladies says ‘ooooohh’, already put in a receptive mood because of the deal that they got on that juicer they just purchased):

1. Defensive Gambling (DG): This stat is pretty easy – I try to recognize that some of the stats that people get on defense are related to gambling on some level. (Gambling in a passing lane, gambling by leaving your man to get a weak side shot block, gambling by trying to strip a man when the ref is right there, and so forth) We already had blocks and steals . . . but they exist in a world without accumulated risks. The risk here, of course, exists as a foul being called – another stat that we already have. The fun part is balancing the risks vs. the rewards.

The Foul is the base for this equation – as it means that you tried a risky move and you got burned. Not only do you have a penalty against you, but it directly benefits the offensive team. A steal, on the other hand, is a situation where a player takes a risk, is rewarded – and the offensive team is directly disadvantaged. When a team misses a three pointer and the opposing team gets the ball and scores a layup that is a 5 point swing. A steal does not directly mean you gain points, but you directly prevent the chance of points – it’s not a 5 point swing, but it’s a possession swing. I say that this is worth 1.5 fouls, in terms of risk/reward. A block does not guarantee such a similar swing in terms of possession (it does sometimes though), but while a steal only prevents the potential of a shot being taken, a block directly affects shots that are taken. (It’s a shame there’s no stat for shots changed, because a good shot blocker has an aura that surrounds him that changes many shots – for example when players started to scout Kirilenko his blocks went way down . . . but he was changing the same number of net shots as guys changed their shots to avoid getting blocked by him) A block, then, is not as good as a steal, but it’s still good – a block is equal to 1.3 fouls. The full equation for Defensive Gambling is as follows:

Example: In 2003-2004 Andrei Kirilekno was healthy (at this point in his career, he had played in 240 of a total possible 246 games), getting playing time (37.1 mpg), and happy. That season Andrei had 215 blocked shots and 150 steals against 174 fouls. His Defensive Gambling score was astronomical that season. DG = [ ( 215 * 1.3) + (150 * 1.5) ] / 174 DG = [ 279.5 + 225 ] / 174 DG = 3.002893563 So that means that Andrei was gambling at a very fortuitous rate – he’d get away with gambling three times before he would get burned once. If you extrapolate that to how many fouls he averaged per game that season you can see that he was doing something right with all that time on the court. Because the haters probably want to know, Andrei’s career average DG score is 2.25. For a point of reference, Scottie Pippen’s career DG score is 1.41 – and Pip is the prototypical wing defender who made 10 All-Defensive teams in his career. Pippen had way more steals, but he took way too many poor gambles as well. Pippen has 6 seasons where he’s averaged greater than 3 fouls per game. Andrei has none in his career. So put that in your pipe and smoke it!

Clearly looking at things like blocks and steals on their own gives a skewed view of the world – putting it against a risk/reward system is a better frame of reference that we can use to see which players make smart gambles, and which ones do not. Andrei – for all his faults – has a good Defensive Gambling ability if you ask me.

2. Pure Hustle (PH): Pure hustle builds off of the Defensive Gambling equation, but adds more chances for risks and more chances for rewards. Here we see Blocks, Steals and Offensive Rebounds go against Turnovers and Persona Fouls. The common factor for hustle is a turn over. It’s the most benign result of hustle. Too much hustle can result in a foul – which hurts you and your team. This is why a foul is worth more. On the good side of things, hustle can result in good defense, or a second effort (or third, or fourth) on offense. We all remember Tayshawn Prince robbing Reggie Miller with a game winning block. We should all remember Bird stealing the inbounds from Isiah. And we all know that second chance shots can not only allow you to score from an advantageous position – but also result in scores themselves. This is why I think when it comes to hustle, Offensive Rebounds are worth the most, with Blocks and Steals being on equal footing with fouls.

Example: When people think of hustle they are apt to think of garbage guys who don’t have much skill. That type of scrappy play can result in solid contributions for a team, but I think hustle is more than just effort. Hustle is assisted by skill and psychology. It is a risk/reward equation after all – if you go all out all the time you’re just going to pick up fouls. You have to know when to go all out, and when to hold back. Many people hated him, but no one could deny the Pure Hustle of Dennis Rodman. Rodman has 4329 career Offensive Rebounds, 611 career Steals and 531 career Blocks. They aren’t the best numbers around, but when you input them with his 1481 career turnovers and 2843 career fouls he manages a Pure Hustle rating of 1.80. This may not look like much, but for a frame of reference, Paul Millsap (what most current Jazz fans think Pure Hustle is all about) has managed a career Pure Hustle value of 1.24. So if Paul Millsap is giving 110% out there, Dennis Rodman is giving 155% out there.

 3. Shooting Worth (SW): This is an easy one, because it already exists on many website by it’s other name “Points per Shot” (PPS). It’s just how many total points you get (including free throws) divided by the number of shots (FGA) you take. Sure, there’s some points that may be unrepresented by FGA (like technical fouls, or being in the bonus), but the fact that the player is involved in those free throws is a benefit that they get for being good shooters. The idea is that if you take a shot it’s worth two points, right? Well, that doesn’t always work out in the PROs, and the league average (or mean for all player data) is 1.22. [Yes, I looked at every shot in the L last year on ESPN.com] So, in effect, you have a positive Shooting Worth if you are better than average, and have a SW greater than 1.22 – of course, you can still be good at your job if you have a lower value; you’d just be below league average. That’s the crux of this statistic – it seems to display individuals who take good shots, and this stat can be used to better differentiate between guys who score a high ppg who take good shots, or the guys who shoot a lot in order to get good stats.

Example: Allen Iverson has been a phenomenal scorer in his career. He’s averaged over 30 ppg on four separate occasions, and even with his no-show last year his career average is still 27.1 ppg. That’s a really great average, but how does that really stack up against a guy who averages something similar, but shoots much better than 42.5 fg%? Well, when you input Iverson's 23983 total career points over his 19,590 total shots you see that his actual Shooting Worth is 1.22 – which is exactly average. He’s not a “better” scorer than some of his contemporaries, he’s just a volume scorer. Karl Malone only has a career scoring average that’s in the 25 points per game range – but unlike Ivey, Karl was much better than average when it came to the quality of his shots; Karl’s Shooting Worth was 1.41 (better than lots of other known scorers like Kobe, Jerry West and Glen Rice, to name a few). From this we can conclude that a shot by Allen Iverson was, in effect, worth less than a shot by Karl – Karl was taking better shots.

 4. Shot Frequency (SF): Some websites try to find out often a player shoots and they represent it by the number of shots / value of time (usually minutes). I don’t know what 0.282 shots looks like, so that representation means little to me. I would rather look at the same data in another way, namely, how many minutes of burn does a player need before he jacks up a shot. Some guys start shooting the ball as soon as they are on the court, while others spend a lot of time on the court – but don’t shoot the ball. In effect, this stat (Shot Frequency) will be able to identify if a certain player is gun shy to a fault (some would say that John Stockton was) or a pure, unashamed jacker of shots (too many to name). In this case, the lower the number means a higher frequency of shots . . . because the number represented is the time needed on the floor between shots. To find this out we divide the total minutes played by the number of Field Goals attempted (FGA).

Example: Let’s continue talking about Iverson here. Most of his life he’s been the first option on offense … a guy that the rest of the team made way for. As a result, he spent a lot of his career shooting the ball. How often does he shoot? Well, he’s played in 36719 minutes and taken 19690 total field goal attempts in that time. If you input the data it reveals that Allen Iverson, for his career, will shot the ball once every 1.865 minutes he’s on the floor. To be honest, this is the highest frequency I’ve seen in all my months ‘beta testing’ these statistics. 1.865 minutes is every 1:52 of actual game time. So that means if he plays 35 minutes in a game he’ll shoot the ball nearly 19 times. For a point of reference another Hall of Fame type “point guard” is John Stockton, who shot the ball once every 3.497 minutes (once ever 3:30 of game time). If given the same amount of time (35 minutes), Stockton would shoot the ball 10 times. (Really, 10 times, 10.008 is pretty darn accurate!) That’s almost half as many shots as Iverson . . . and effectively, half as frequent.

This statistic helps us understand which guys really shoot the ball the most, and most likely, are the primary offensive options for any given team. (Though, some anomalies exist, like Matt Harpring who shoots the ball very frequently for a guy with his skills – he shot the ball more often than some guys who started over him during his career)

Gestalt Offense (GO): This is the biggie. I’ve fretted over this for days and days and finally am prepared to release it upon an unwitting population. It’s not perfect, and it seems to only work best with larger sample sizes (a seasons’ worth of data, or a road trip, may look fine – any singular game can break it). It really favors guards and only really works best for players who played in a modern-ish era (one where turnovers, offensive rebounds and other similar statistics were actually recorded). The basis for this was to isolate how much pressure certain players could place on the defense. What a player does on offense (when it comes to stats) can be either one of five things: he can assist on a score, he can get to the foul line, he can take a shot, he can be called for a turn over, or he can grab and offensive rebound. There are no stats for setting solid screens, or anything like the ‘hockey assist’ right now with how the stats are kept. So the statistic is already limited, but I try to do the best with the data that I have. Essentially the GO Rating is the summation of a player’s modified assists, free throw opportunities, offensive rebounding ability, penchant for scoring against their turnovers, all over the number of games a player has played:

Of course, it’s a lot more complicated than that . . .

The first, and most straight forward, part of the equation is assists. This equation not only values assists higher than their normal value ( 2.23 > 1, after all), but it also serves to give a bonus to good passers, and penalize poor passers. (Good or poor depending on if they have a high Assist to Turnover Ratio) The first standard value here is 2.23. Where did this value come from? Well, it’s the true value of an assist when you balance it for the ratio of assisted 2PTFG vs. 3PTFG. (According to the stats on ESPN.com, where all the major stats came from, aside from archived player stats from Basketball-Reference.com) The second standard number is 1.48, this is the mean Assist to Turnover ratio for teams in the NBA. (Room for improvement exists here if I could actually find the mean Assist to Turnover ratio for the players) As it stands how good you are at passing (vs. turning it over) affects how many total points you get from this category. After all, Tim Hardaway may be able to get you 37 assists on a road trip, but those 37 assists would be better than 37 assists from Alonzo Mourning because Zo would pick up quite a few more turnovers along the way.

Free throws are simple enough to understand now that we’ve gone through assists. Here we don’t look at how many free throws an individual has made, as the point of the GO rating was to see the type of pressure that an offensive player puts on the defense. Instead the focus is to see how many free throw attempts the player gets. Of course the catch is that value for FGA is modified by how good a shooter you are compared to the league average (which is 77%). A guy like José Manuel Calderón may only go to the line half the time as someone like Shaq – but Shaq is below average and Jose above average to the point that the difference in points from this category are not as large as we would think. Again, like in assists, it’s a bonus to good shooters and penalty to those who are not so hot from the line. In effect, you want your best free throw shooters at the line, their FTA are then worth more than that of guys who do not go to the line with as much confidence as they do.

Rebounding is easy. I figured that in the grand scheme of things, an Offensive Rebound is worth 1.16 points. I based this on how a Turnover is 1.3 points (see below), how an assist is 2.23 points and how points are worth, well, points. This is a modifier. The second modifier is similar to previous categories. Before we looked at if the player was better than average at Assist to turnover ratio, and then how they fared in FT% against the mean. Here we see that 26.73% of the total rebounds in the NBA were offensive rebounds. If you are a better than average offensive rebounder then you get a bonus here, if you are worse, then you get a negative modifier (as seen as a number less than 1.0, but not a negative number, per se). This part of the equation really seems to get broken if used on Charles Barkley (who, if you look at just one game, would get some crazy number of points in this section because he had 11 offensive rebounds and 5 defensive ones). Thankfully this section self-neuters itself if you have zero offensive rebounds.

Man, where do I begin with this one? Well, we went over Shot Frequency already. We divide 33.6 (representing 33.6 minutes of action for an elite player) by the player’s own Shot Frequency. This tells us how many shots he will put up if given Starter type of minutes. The next step is adding 1 to the Effective Field Goal Percentage (eFG%). This is so that we get a positive value with the percentage when multiplied. Why use eFG% instead of just regular FG%? Well, eFG% adds into account three point shots, and the higher degree of difficulty of shooting from that distance. (For more info on eFG% click here) This step tries to even things out a bit. The third part is how the player’s Shot Worth (also described earlier) rates compared to the league average for Shot Worth (or PPS). If you are Malone-like, you get a nice bonus here, if you are Iverson-like, you don’t get a bonus, and if you are really poor, then you get a penalty. The last part is the total points scored by the individual, divided by 10. Ten was one of the first numbers I used that seemed to make things work out when I was fiddling around. I don’t know if this last section of the Shooting section is legit or not yet, I remember when I tried this out without the last part that individuals would be getting very little from this part of the equation. At some stage you have to factor in how many points a guys scores, even if you are looking are how well they shoot.

Uhhhh, so this is very easy to understand. I’m not going to mention anything more than that this value is subtracted from the rest of the section values in the numerator. Don’t forget to divide everything by the total number of games, ya here!

Man, I’m super duper tired, so I’m just going to go ahead and post this. Give me feedback, tell me I’m crazy and set me straight. I think we need mores stats, and unfortunately, the lack of defensive categories means I can’t make a Defensive GO rating type of stat. I’m open to changing my formulas and re-working things. If you want I can e-mail you the spread sheet that contains the Macro that calculates these new stats. (I got really sick and tired of calculating the GO Rating by hand with pen and paper.)

I will probably make another post on the Go Rating in the future, filled with examples of players, and how they rated. So far I’ve seen that eFG%, Total Points, Assist to turnover ratio and a few other factors really seem to hinder bigmen, while giving guards and other wing players a boost. For the record, Magic Johnson’s GO Rating is 102.241, and he is the gold standard . . . some guys score higher than he does, while others politely fall into place. (Jordan is at 120, Karl Malone at 83, and so forth.)

NBA Stars Back in the Day . . .

I got this from over here, and props to them for finding it. It's kind of entertaining to see some of the 'personality' of these stars stay consistent from way back then: for example Alonzo Mourning looks like he wants to fight, Kobe is smug because he's popular, and Magic is a smiling fool. I do agree with the author of that post that I am stealing this from (ethanator1088) that Larry Bird looks like he was born during the depression according to this picture. Anyway . . . enjoy the video.

Here's the full list of kids pics:
Allen Iverson Kevin Garnett Emanuel Ginobili Baron Davis Emeka Okafor Shaquille O'Neal Pau Gasol Dennis Rodman Devin Harris Shawn Kemp (looks like LeBron's dad . . . I'm just saying) Yao Ming Tony Parker Kobe Bryant Larry Johnson Vince Carter Tim Duncan Charles Barkley Mike Bibby Alonzo Mourning
Andrei Kirilenko Dwyane Wade John Stockton Kenyon Martin Magic Johnson Anfernee Hardaway Scottie Pippen Sebastian Telfair (with cousin Stephon) Reggie Miller	Dirk Nowitzki Larry Bird Karl Malone Pete Maravich Grant Hill Dominique Wilkins Steve Francis Jason Williams Paul Pierce Patrick Ewing (looking to be sponsored) Michael Jordan

Fun stuff . . . the song is kind of down-tempo though, so if you like Sarah McLachlan then you'll like this. (and really, who doesn't own a few of her albums already . . .)

The Five Epic Errors of Jerry Eugene Sloan

I like Jerry Sloan and respect him for what he has done for the NBA, and what he has brought to the game. He and his staff (Phil Johnson, and any combination of Ty Corbin, Gordon Chiesa, Kenny Natt, Scott Layden, etc) are undervalued developers of talent and teachers of the game. For example, DeShawn Stevenson was not an NBA player when he joined the league -- 4 years learning in Utah made him a player. For one, they completely broke down his shot, and rebuilt it like the $6 Million Dollar man over those 4 years as he worked with Hornacek for quite a bit -- now he's a capable three point shooter, not an athletic Desmond Mason type with ugly mechanics and no outside shot. Another thing that is undervalued is the fact that Jerry Sloan (and staff) is quite good at making game to game adjustments. (Some will argue that he doesn't make meaningful adjustments -- but those are in-game adjustments, which I readily agree he is poor at -- his game to game adjustments are among the best in the league. For proof watch the NBA playoffs)

Sloan is well respected in league circles, though he is consistently regarded as a few notches down from the likes of Phil Jackson, Gregg Popovich, Pat Riley, Don Nelson (who has 3 CoY awards!), Larry Brown, Rudy Tomjanovich, Jeff Van Gundy (who is not currently employed as a coach) and others. Sloan is well respected, but guys like Bryon Scott, Sam Mitchell, Rick Carlisle, Doc Rivers and Don Chaney have won Coach of the Year Awards. [Opinion Alert: I think that Sloan is a better coach than any of those guys]

Scott is an okay coach, Mitchell is a 5 game loss streak away from being fired, and Doc Rivers was fired as a coach something like 7 times already. Don Chaney has a .406 winning percentage, of if you will allow me, roughly a 60% losing percentage. He has two playoff wins in his career as a coach. He has been a CoY, while Sloan has not.

It's not about Coach of the Year Awards though, as Sloan's top assistant coach (Phil Johnson) was NBA Coach of the Year in 1974-1975. What it is about, though, is understanding why Sloan (for all of his good attributes) seems to be a step behind that first group, and stuck in a situation where former Players with little coaching experience get awards that have so far eluded him. What are the major lacunae in Jerry Sloan's abilities as a coach?

1. Playing Time / Rotation Management:

		Jerry Sloan has had the benefit of having John Stockton QB his teams since Jerry Sloan first became the Head Coach in '88. Stockton has always heeded Jerry's command (like any good soldier), and as such, he was at the mercy of Sloan during the most important 12 games of John Stockton's career -- the NBA Finals in 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. Jer' has coached John for quite a while, so you'd think Jerry knew how important these games were to John's career and future legacy.
Photographed by Andrew D. Bernstein/NBAE via Getty Images

But one of Jerry Sloan's major flaws was expressed in those 12 games. Sloan likes to stick to a rotation, which may or may not have contributed to prolonging the careers of his players at the expense of wins. Malone and Stockton both played up to the age of 40 -- but a few seasons before they'd reach those milestones they were in the NBA Finals. In those years Sloan's regimented playing time and rotation scheme called for Stockton to exit the game at the 6 min mark of every first quarter -- regardless of any other circumstances in the game (who was on the floor, were the Jazz on a run, who had fouls, who were they playing against, what the score was, etc). Sure, this may have saved John for the playoffs -- but when the Jazz finally got to the finals, why did he continue to hold John back?

Stockton was easily the best and most consistent player during those finals runs, and it would be pure folly to imply that the Jazz weren't a better Jazz team with Stockton on the floor (no matter how very adequate, and sometimes amazing Howard Eisley actually was during those same years -- you know, like having your back-up PG go coast to coast to hit game winning threes with the audacity to not call a time out, or pass to a starter). The fact that the Jazz were better is not debatable. While there are many factors which influence a win (especially in the NBA Finals), in the games that the Jazz won against the Bulls over those two seasons had John Stockton averaging 37.0 mpg. What about in the Jazz losses? John was anchored to the bench for 33.8 mpg. Correlation does not always translate to causation -- but really Jerry, what were you saving Stockton for when you had him playing 31 mins and 33 mins in game 4 and 6 in the 1998 Finals -- games where the Jazz lost by a COMBINED 5 points, were you saving him for the next round after that, or the off-season? Now, I'm not saying that if Jerry played Stockton more that we would have won the title, no one can say that. What I am saying is that perhaps if he was on the floor more (like to end the 1st quarter, so the Jazz wouldn't start the 2nd quarter already behind and have to fight their way back into every game), the Jazz would have had a better shot to win more games.

	1996-1997				1997-1998
Finals Game #	Stockton's Minutes Played	Outcome	Difference		Stockton's Minutes Played	Outcome	Difference
Game 1	38	Loss	-2		35	Win	+3
Game 2	39	Loss	-12		31	Loss	-5
Game 3	37	Win	+11		26	Loss	-42
Game 4	38	Win	+5		31	Loss	-4
Game 5	36	Loss	-2		38	Win	+2
Game 6	37	Loss	-4		33	Loss	-1

Stockton's MPG in Wins: 37.0 mpg -- Stockton's MPG in Losses: 33.8 mpg.

Current examples of Jerry Sloan's crazy substitution pattern exist in the whole Matt Harpring / Andrei Kirilenko dynamic (where Harpring's mins have been cut a bit, but he still gets way more burn than he needs in the face of evidence that Andrei's magic number is 37 mpg, any less, and he's not amazing). And let's not even get into the whole "younger player" issue (you know, like playing Deron Williams so little as a rookie, and at that, playing him at Shooting Guard instead of Point Guard, and so forth -- but more on that below).

Jerry's use (or disuse) of Stockton at a very critical time is probably the best example of him being bull-headed and sticking to his system against evidence that suggests that it may be okay to run the horses a bit. Then again, this was the Jazz Sloan who used to play Adam Keefe 27.5 mpg or something insane like that.  

2. Very slow to adapt to changes in the game:

Do you ever watch games on TV and when one team goes on a run, to stop the momentum and regroup, the other team's coach may call a time out? Yeah, Jerry Sloan hardly ever does that. Jerry Sloan hoards time outs and possibly thinks that they are like roll-over minutes with his cell phone plan. Unfortunately they are not. Some coaches can get away with not calling a time out, like Phil Jackson, but that's only because he has some heady vets on his team (like Kobe and Fisher, who have played in a few NBA Finals games) -- Sloan could get away with this back when the average age of the team was 33 and everyone was battle tested in the playoffs like in those Finals teams. That's not the case with this team -- he should probably use time outs a bit more. Especially when other teams go on their 2nd quarter runs.

Photographed by unknown, NBAE/Getty Images

That's just one thing though . . . adaptation is the key to survival -- in nature and in the NBA. (unless you have tenure, like Sloan does) Sloan does an okay job making game-to-game adjustments as I've already mentioned . . . but he loves his game plan. He will go into a game with one plan, and one plan alone. If the plan does not work, he will continue with that plan just to prove a point or because he is stubborn, or maybe, because he honestly did not believe than an alternative plan was even needed. (As he sits dumbfounded with his mouth agape as the Jazz get blown out in the finals by 42 points in one game) If another guy is really hot, how often do we see any defensive scheme changes to counter this? Jerry Sloan's idea of changing things up defensively seems to just mean shuffling around who defends a particular player. (Hmmm, Tim Duncan is killing Memo one on one, let's put Boozer on him . . . hmmmm . . . Tim Duncan is killing Boozer one on one, let's put Jarron on him . . . . hmmmm . . . Tim Duncan is killing Jarron one on one, let's put Hoffa on him . . .  ad nauseam)

3. His Personal Pet Peeves hamstring the teams he coaches:

You ever wonder why some players just go off on the Jazz? It's partly because of the whole inability to make in-game changes. The other, probably more chronic, issue is the fact that Jerry Sloan has a very diverse and particular set of pet peeves. No, I'm not talking about everyone having to have their shirt tucked in, or no head bands or whatever . . . I'm talking about the fact that he'd rather kiss Phil Jackson's ass than actually set up a defensive scheme that calls for double teaming someone. Do you guys remember that game where LeBron James had his first 50+ point game of his career? The game where it was basically Devon Brown, Matt Harpring and Andrei Kirilenko guarding him one on one for 48 minutes? [just watch that video, each one of his baskets is made by being defended one on one, even after he had scored 39 points, Sloan keeps the Jazz in single, man to man defense] I know LeBron is good, Jerry should too by now. I know he can win a game by scoring 50+ points -- I'd rather go with him passing it up to Anderson Varejao or Eric Snow (who was on the team back then) and have them try to beat us instead.

Forget the scrubs, if there is anywhere that the Jerry Sloan Jazz want you to beat them from it is from the outside. Utah has always seemed like they just wanted to dare other teams into taking outside shots. This strategy may be a remnant from the Sloan's Dick Motta inspired playbook that was created back when teams did not really shoot often from deep, nor did they have players who were good at that. Times have changed and today's NBA features many teams that not only like to take open three point shots, but have multiple threats from downtown. For example, just look at the LA Lakers who have tons of outside shooters (Kobe, Fisher, Sasha, Vlad-Rad, Farmar, Walton, Ariza and even Odom can knock down jumpers), is it any wonder why we lost to them? Sloan: oh noes! Teams that can make wide open jumpers when no one is even close to defending the open man -- my ONE weakness . . . how did you know?

Photographed by Barry Gossage, NBAE/Getty Images

The whole three point line thing seems to be just an under-explored and confusing aspect of the game for Sloan (like the concept of the female orgasm in good, old fashioned, 1950's America). Local heartthrob Kyle Korver admits that the Jazz do not have plays in the playbook for a last second three -- or any plays that really have the three point shot in mind at all. (Which explains why our last offensive play of the 2007-2008 season was a sequence of bricked shots, or why Matt Harpring was taking awkward looking, last second mid-range jumpers for us in previous seasons when we needed a bucket.) 

So he doesn't like to double team, which allows for the other teams' best offensive player to go to work and score a lot of points. He also doesn't like the outside shot -- and that would work great if there was a specific code of honor that all coaches lived by: 'I won't use the three point line, and you don't use it either, deal?' Jerry, other teams will take what you give them, and if you give them open looks from deep, they will take those shots and burry us with them. (And have been for seasons) Anything else?

He is pretty old school, and that old-school-ness can work for some players and be absolutely horrible for others. Greg Ostertag was a flawed player, but I have no doubt that if Ostertag had a more touchy-feely coach that he could have been no lesser than a Luc Longley (who was a solid starter), rather than a guy who was dunked on slightly less than Shawn Bradley.

His major pet peeve is perceived effort. Which probably explains why guys like Adam Keefe and Matt Harpring get burn over the more talented, yet apparently less hard working guys like Chris Morris and Gordan Giricek (when he was here). [Btw, look at Giri's career stats, he wasn't a bad player at all, neither was Morris . . . yet look at how they were used in our system. Were they bad players, or just used poorly?] I understand the meritocracy involved in rewarding hard working players with playing time, but what about wins?

Photographed by Matthias B. Krause/Icon SMI

Chris Morris and Giricek would absolutely smoke Harpring and Keefe in a game of 2-on-2. They were better players, even if Sloan did not treat them as such. Which brings us to how Jerry Sloan . . .

4. Revels in Power Distance:

Jerry Sloan is the boss. His staff knows it. The owner of the team knows it. The media knows it. And most importantly, his players know it. And as far as being the boss, he's far from the most approachable, understanding, and cooperative one around. He takes issue with star player and scrub alike -- he admitted that if you could freeze time during that moment when Stockton got the defensive rebound and threw the football hail marry pass to Malone in the finals for a key bucket in the 4th quarter that he would have liked to strangle Stockton while the ball was in the air. (Really, who says these things, even if they are true?) The issues that he has with players can stem from a lot of root causes: perceived self-worth (Carlos Arroyo), consistent effort (Greg Ostertag), sexual orientation (John Amaechi), degree of free will and autonomy (Gordan Giricek), inability to read minds and/or complete objectives that are never fully explained or consistent from game to game (Andrei Kirilenko).

I freely admit that I'm kind of an AK-47 homer. He used to be 'The Man' and has had to adjust to different roles on the fly -- while getting none of the credit that he deserves from Sloan. One season, he's the Point Forward and earns a trip to the All-Star game. The next, he's a leper. The next, he starts off as a leper, but due to injuries, his role is expanded. (Guess what, he started to play better!) His role has oscillated like a yo-yo for the last couple of seasons depending on roster moves and injuries to other guys. (as has his playing time) He can do everything from get a triple double or 5x5 to play point guard in the Western Conference Playoffs against Baron Davis. It is insane to think that he's not the most versatile and over-all talented player on the team.

Photographed by Matt Slocum, AP Photo

Deron is the best player, and most consistent. This is not up for debate. Neither should be the fact that Andrei is paid on a scale that only makes sense based on his talent and ability -- and not how he is used or applied. (Who chooses how he is used again? The Head Coach.) As good as Andrei is the last few seasons with Jerry Sloan have pretty much ruined him. It would not surprise me to see Andrei leave the NBA for good after his contract is over and return to his native Russia a hero. Why am I blaming Jerry Sloan?

I'm blaming Sloan because he's the one who should be the guy who helps manage players -- especially players who have changing roles and need to make transitions. Probably no transition is harder to make than from being 'The Man' to being the 5th option on offense, yet the thankless workhorse on defense. Phil Jackson, for all of his smarmy-ness and douche-baggery , has been able to coax nutcases like Dennis Rodman, Bison Dele, Ron Harper, J.R. Rider and others to perform at a high level. Sloan and AK have worked together for 8 or so years now, why does AK still not know what he's supposed to be doing?

Maybe it happens to be because Sloan keeps changing his expectations of him, and due to his power distance, AK is the only one who gets the blame when things go wrong. Other players have long since gotten the boot for getting 'sideways' with Jerry Sloan. (Sloan just knows that AK's defense is so valuable that he can't completely kick him off the team) Personality is a big part of communication, and when you give someone so much power it's hard for their sense of 'right' to not come out in their personality. The psychological aspects of motivation are just as puzzling to Jerry Sloan as the three point shot appears to be. I guess in his hard headed universe (you know, the kind where there is no back up plan for any given game) there is only one way to motivate -- by yelling, swearing and saying mean things. This is probably a contributing factor as to why when AK is taken out of the game he sits as far away from Sloan as possible -- Sloan is just an impossible guy sometimes.

5. Makes mistakes, admits to making mistakes, does not change so mistakes can continue to be made in the future:

Jerry Sloan can be 'like' an abusive spouse in his consistent merry-go-round of making mistakes, admitting to making mistakes, suggesting that changes will be made, but actually no real changes are made, and mistakes continue to occur. How many times do we hear (after a season is over) that "I probably should have played __________ (insert breakout player's name here, some recent examples include Mehmet Okur, Deron Williams, and Ronnie Brewer) more during the season"? Pretty much every season. Memo had a break out year, and Sloan said that it was a mistake to not have played him more. The next season they draft Deron -- and again, Sloan does not play him as much as he should -- only to say that he should have, after the fact. What happens the next season? Ronnie Brewer doesn't play, and after his 2nd season Sloan basically says "My bad" again. And we just eat it up -- our neutral reaction to his maladaptive behavior reinforces his psychopathology.

Sloan is an old dog, and he does not want to learn new tricks. He has shown some improvement over time (that probably only I have noticed), he allows guys like Memo to shoot threes, and is not completely against a guy throwing an alley-oop now and then. (He still may not like it, but he's not going to bench a guy for getting an assist) Unfortunately, the majority of his change seems to occur over a span of 10 games. I don't want to belabor the point but part of the whole AK situation is that Andrei will complain because of how he is used, Sloan and him will talk and Sloan will agree to make changes, the next few games things are better and AK is more productive, then after 10 games or so, things will revert back to normal and the cycle will start again. (Part of the reason why this Sloan/AK deal is less resolved than it should be happens to be because it is never really resolved fully.)

How many coaches would make a habit of pissing off their best players by not giving them the playing time that their skills deserve? Deron Williams will never fully heal, and while he respects Sloan as a coach (and his Boss), he still isn't shy about admitting that he knows he should have played more as a rookie (you know, the season where everyone was all about Chris Paul, and no one mentioned Deron because he wasn't playing?). I don't know if Memo cares about how he was treated, but the younger guys probably do care (like Brewer, and likely, C.J.). For the record, Deron, Ronnie, Andrei and Memo comprise 80% of the starting line-up. Those are all guys that Sloan has made significant impressions (first or most recent in the case of Andrei) on as 'the guy who is going to be a dick and not play you, even though you are better than the guys who get playing time'. One wonders who the 'next' guy he'll come out and suggest he should have played more will be? My money is on Fesenko, after next season when he starts off averaging 4.3 mpg with the Jazz only to end up being better than Jarron Collins and finally usurp his mpg.

Photo from memo13.com

Sloan is old school and I appreciate and respect the fact that when he is wrong he is really okay with saying it like it is. He will admit to being wrong in the instances where he understands that he is wrong. (Unlike a guy like Phil Jackson who will make an infinite number of excuses for anything bad that happens, like blaming the physical play of the other team, their fans, injuries, etc) I would appreciate Sloan even more if he actually stuck to fixing the mistakes, even if that would prevent him from admitting to making them in the first place.

Conclusion:

Wow, if you add it all up these 5 errors truly are epic. This is pretty much a negative review of the only coach my team has had for the last 20 seasons . . . so I'm sure it will have to write a piece about the 5 great things that Sloan does. (And there are at least 5 of them) I don't hate Sloan, but that does not mean that I'm blind to the faults that he does have. I try to be objective on this regard. I think that there is room for improvement (and his staff helps out with this), and I do not know which coach I'd rather have take over my team if you gave me the choice to do so this moment. (Maybe years down the line after Phil Johnson says 'no thanks' I'd be okay with Ty stepping up) All coaches have their flaws, I'm just more intimately aware of Sloan's because I've been an obsessive Jazz fan for the over 60% of my life.